Hair-Trigger Alignment: Black-Box Evaluation Cannot Guarantee Post-Update Alignment
Yavuz Faruk Bakman, Duygu Nur Yaldiz, Eleni Triantafillou, Peter Kairouz, Salman Avestimehr, Sai Praneeth Reddy Karimireddy
摘要
Large Language Models (LLMs) are rarely static and are frequently updated in practice. A growing body of alignment research has shown that models initially deemed ``aligned'' can exhibit misaligned behavior after fine-tuning. These works typically assume that the initial model is aligned based on static black-box evaluation, i.e., the absence of undesired responses to a fixed set of queries. However, the limits of black-box evaluation for post-update scenarios is not explored sufficiently. In this work, we formalize model alignment in both the static and post-update settings and uncover a fundamental limitation of black-box evaluation. We theoretically show that, due to overparameterization, static alignment provides no guarantee of post-update alignment for any update dataset. Moreover, we prove that static black-box probing cannot distinguish a model that is genuinely post-update robust from one that conceals an arbitrary amount of adversarial behavior which can be activated by even a single benign gradient update. We further validate these findings empirically in LLMs across three core alignment domains: privacy, jailbreak safety, and behavioral honesty. We demonstrate the existence of LLMs that pass all standard black-box alignment tests, yet become severely misaligned after a single benign update. Finally, we show that the capacity to hide such latent adversarial behavior increases with model scale, confirming our theoretical prediction that post-update misalignment grows with the number of parameters. Together, our results highlight the inadequacy of static evaluation protocols and emphasize the urgent need for post-update--robust alignment evaluation. Code can be found here .
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