Available Attestation: Towards a Reorg-Resilient Solution for Ethereum Proof-of-Stake
摘要
Ethereum transitioned from Proof-of-Work consensus to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus in September 2022. While this upgrade brings significant improvements (e.g., lower energy costs and higher throughput), it also introduces new vulnerabilities. One notable example is the so-called malicious reorganization attack. Malicious reorganization denotes an attack in which the Byzantine faulty validators intentionally manipulate the canonical chain so the blocks by honest validators are discarded. By doing so, the faulty validators can gain benefits such as higher rewards, lower chain quality, or even posing a liveness threat to the system. In this work, we show that the majority of the known attacks on Ethereum PoS are some form of reorganization attacks. In practice, most of these attacks can be launched even if the network is synchronous (there exists a known upper bound for message transmission and processing). Different from existing studies that mitigate the attacks in an ad-hoc way, we take a systematic approach and provide an elegant yet efficient solution to reorganization attacks. Our solution is provably secure such that no reorganization attacks can be launched in a synchronous network. In a partially synchronous network, our approach achieves the conventional safety and liveness properties of the consensus protocol. Our evaluation results show that our solution is resilient to five types of reorganization attacks and also highly efficient.
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脉络
- Exploiting PoH Time Semantics in Solana via Re-Anchoring and Forking 引用了 Max Attestation Matters: Making Honest Parties Lose Their Incentives in Ethereum PoS
- BunnyFinder: Finding Incentive Flaws for Ethereum Consensus 引用了 Ebb-and-Flow Protocols: A Resolution of the Availability-Finality Dilemma
- BunnyFinder: Finding Incentive Flaws for Ethereum Consensus 引用了 Max Attestation Matters: Making Honest Parties Lose Their Incentives in Ethereum PoS
引用它的顶会 Paper2
它引用的 Paper5
- Order-Fairness for Byzantine ConsensusMahimna Kelkar, Fan Zhang, Steven Goldfeder, Ari JuelsCRYPTO 2020 · 152 次引用
- Ebb-and-Flow Protocols: A Resolution of the Availability-Finality DilemmaJoachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David TseS&P 2021 · 105 次引用
- Foundations of Dynamic BFTSisi Duan, Haibin ZhangS&P 2022 · 57 次引用
- Max Attestation Matters: Making Honest Parties Lose Their Incentives in Ethereum PoSMingfei Zhang, Rujia Li, Sisi DuanUSENIX Security 2024 · 20 次引用
- Autobahn: Seamless high speed BFTNeil Giridharan, Florian Suri-Payer, Ittai Abraham, Lorenzo Alvisi 等SOSP 2024 · 13 次引用
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