Snatcher: Apple Find My Network Exposes Your Lost Devices To Strangers
Zhenyu Ren, Yanbo Zhang, Boya Liu, Mo Li
摘要
Apple's Find My network connects nearly one billion devices to locate missing property via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). This paper reveals that insecure BLE advertisements and design tradeoffs allow unauthorized discovery and physical theft of lost Apple devices. We develop Snatcher, an attack and analysis framework implemented fully on Android smartphones without specialized hardware. Snatcher identifies vulnerabilities in unencrypted BLE advertisements, unauthenticated acoustic triggers, and slow MAC address randomization. Through three levels-sound-based direction finding, RSSI-IMU sensor-fusion navigation, and spatial-temporal clustering-our Android-based platform physically tracks and locates lost Apple accessories and devices in real-world tests. Our results highlight a crucial conflict between privacy protection, antistalking design, and physical security, urging Apple to strengthen Find My defenses. CCS Concepts • Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security.
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