Synthesizing Plausible Privacy-Preserving Location Traces
Vincent Bindschaedler, Reza Shokri
摘要
Camouflaging user's actual location with fakes is a prevalent obfuscation technique for protecting location privacy. We show that the protection mechanisms based on the existing (ad hoc) techniques for generating fake locations are easily broken by inference attacks. They are also detrimental to many utility functions, as they fail to credibly imitate the mobility of living people. This paper introduces a systematic approach to synthesizing plausible location traces. We propose metrics that capture both geographic and semantic features of real location traces. Based on these statistical metrics, we design a privacy-preserving generative model to synthesize location traces which are plausible to be trajectories of some individuals with consistent lifestyles and meaningful mobilities. Using a stateof-the-art quantitative framework, we show that our synthetic traces can significantly paralyze location inference attacks. We also show that these fake traces have many useful statistical features in common with real traces, thus can be used in many geo-data analysis tasks. We guarantee that the process of generating synthetic traces itself is privacy preserving and ensures plausible deniability. Thus, although the crafted traces statistically resemble human mobility, they do not leak significant information about any particular individual whose data is used in the synthesis process.
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引用它的顶会 Paper17
- Locally Differentially Private Analysis of Graph StatisticsJacob Imola, Takao Murakami, Kamalika ChaudhuriUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 139 次
- Utility-Aware Synthesis of Differentially Private and Attack-Resilient Location TracesMehmet Emre Gursoy, Ling Liu, Stacey Truex, Lei Yu 等CCS 2018 · 被引用 122 次
- LDPTrace: Locally Differentially Private Trajectory SynthesisYuntao Du, Yujia Hu, Zhikun Zhang, Ziquan Fang 等VLDB 2023 · 被引用 84 次
- SoK: Privacy-Preserving Data SynthesisYuzheng Hu, Fan Wu, Qinbin Li, Yunhui Long 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 61 次
- A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct LinkMilan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 59 次
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