Combinatorial Incentive Mechanism for Bundling Spatial Crowdsourcing with Unknown Utilities

Incentive mechanisms in Spatial Crowdsourcing (SC) have been widely studied as they provide an effective way to motivate mobile workers to perform spatial tasks. Yet, most existing mechanisms only involve single tasks, neglecting the presence of complementarity and substitutability among tasks. This limits their effectiveness in practice cases. Motivated by this, we consider task bundles for incentive mechanism design and closely analyze the mutual exclusion effect that arises with task bundles. We then develop a combinatorial incentive mechanism, including three key policies: In the offline case, we propose a combinatorial assignment policy to address the conflict between mutual exclusion and assignment efficiency. We next study the conflict between mutual exclusion and truthfulness, and build a combinatorial pricing policy to pay winners that yields both incentive compatibility and individual rationality. In the online case with unknown workers’ utilities, we present an online combinatorial assignment policy that balances the exploration-exploitation trade-off under the mutual exclusion constraints. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations using real-world mobile networking datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.