Lune

ICML2026顶会

Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Yan Hao Ling, Jonathan Scarlett, Warut Suksompong

2026年份

摘要

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded valuations, we derive upper and lower bounds on the required number of queries for finding an envy-free allocation in terms of the number of items, mm, and the negative-envy of the optimal allocation, Δ\Delta. In particular, when Δ\Delta is not too small (namely, Δ≫m1/4\Delta \gg m^{1/4}), we establish that the optimal number of queries scales as m(Δ/m)2=m2.5Δ2\frac{\sqrt m }{(\Delta / m)^2} = \frac{m^{2.5}}{\Delta^2} up to logarithmic factors. Our upper bound is based on non-adaptive queries and a simple thresholding-based allocation algorithm that runs in polynomial time, while our lower bound holds even under adaptive queries and arbitrary computation time.

问问这篇 Paper

智能体会读完全文。

Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。

可以从这些问题问起

智能体调用

Luneget_paper_fulltext

在 Lune 里问

免费开始,无需绑卡

它引用的顶会 Paper11

相关 Paper

黄昏的海面,两侧是细线勾勒的悬崖