Leveraging the Hints: Adaptive Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions

With the advent and increasing consolidation of e-commerce, digital advertising has very recently replaced traditional advertising as the main marketing force in the economy. In the past four years, a particularly important development in the digital advertising industry is the shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online display ads. This shift immediately motivated the intellectually challenging question of how to bid in first-price auctions, because unlike in second-price auctions, bidding one's private value truthfully is no longer optimal. Following a series of recent works in this area, we consider a differentiated setup: we do not make any assumption about other bidders' maximum bid (i.e. it can be adversarial over time), and instead assume that we have access to a hint that serves as a prediction of other bidders' maximum bid, where the prediction is learned through some blackbox machine learning model. We consider two types of hints: one where a single point-prediction is available, and the other where a hint interval (representing a type of confidence region into which others' maximum bid falls) is available. We establish minimax optimal regret bounds for both cases and highlight the quantitatively different behavior between the two settings. We also provide improved regret bounds when the others' maximum bid exhibits the further structure of sparsity. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with demonstrations using real bidding data.