Don't Yank My Chain: Auditable NF Service Chaining
Guyue Liu, Hugo Sadok, Anne Kohlbrenner, Bryan Parno, Vyas Sekar, Justine Sherry
摘要
Auditing is a crucial component of network security practices in organizations with sensitive information, such as banks and hospitals. Unfortunately, network function virtualization (NFV) is viewed as incompatible with auditing practices which verify that security functions operate correctly. In this paper, we bring the benefits of NFV to security-sensitive environments with the design and implementation of AuditBox.
AuditBox not only makes NFV compatible with auditing, but also provides stronger guarantees than traditional auditing procedures. In traditional auditing, administrators test the system for correctness on a schedule, e.g., once per month. In contrast, AuditBox continuously self-monitors for correct behavior, proving runtime guarantees that the system remains in compliance with policy goals. Furthermore, AuditBox remains compatible with traditional auditing practices by providing sampled logs which still allow auditors to inspect system behavior manually. AuditBox achieves its goals by combining trusted execution environments with a lightweight verified routing protocol (VRP). Despite the complexity of routing policies for service-function chains relative to traditional routing, Audit-Box's protocol introduces 72-80% fewer bytes of overhead per packet (in a 5-hop service chain) and provides 61-67% higher goodput than prior work on VRPs designed for the Internet.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- LemonNFV: Consolidating Heterogeneous Network Functions at Line SpeedHao Li, Yihan Dang, Guangda Sun, Guyue Liu 等NSDI 2023 · 被引用 21 次
- TrustSketch: Trustworthy Sketch-based Telemetry on Cloud HostsZhuo Cheng, Maria Apostolaki, Zaoxing Liu, Vyas SekarNDSS 2024
- ChainPatrol: Balancing Attack Detection and Classification with Performance Overhead for Service Function Chains Using Virtual TrailersMomen Oqaily, Hinddeep Purohit, Yosr Jarraya, Lingyu Wang 等USENIX Security 2024
它引用的顶会 Paper8
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- T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave ProgramsMing-Wei Shih, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim, Marcus PeinadoNDSS 2017 · 被引用 431 次
- EverCrypt: A Fast, Verified, Cross-Platform Cryptographic ProviderJonathan Protzenko, Bryan Parno, Aymeric Fromherz, Chris Hawblitzel 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 114 次
- LightBox: Full-stack Protected Stateful Middlebox at Lightning SpeedHuayi Duan, Cong Wang, Xingliang Yuan, Yajin Zhou 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 88 次
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