PURE: Payments with UWB RElay-protection
Daniele Coppola, Giovanni Camurati, Claudio Anliker, Xenia Hofmeier, Patrick Schaller, David A. Basin, Srdjan Capkun
摘要
Contactless payments are now widely used and are expected to reach $10 trillion worth of transactions by 2027. Although convenient, contactless payments are vulnerable to relay attacks that enable attackers to execute fraudulent payments. A number of countermeasures have been proposed to address this issue, including Mastercard's relay protection mechanism. These countermeasures, although effective against some Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) relays, fail to prevent physicallayer relay attacks. In this work, we leverage the Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) radios incorporated in major smartphones, smartwatches, tags and accessories, and introduce PURE, the first UWB-based relay protection that integrates smoothly into existing contactless payment standards, and prevents even the most sophisticated physical layer attacks. PURE extends EMV payment protocols that are executed between cards and terminals, and does not require any modification to the backend of the issuer, acquirer, or payment network. PURE further tailors UWB ranging to the payment environment (i.e., wireless channels) to achieve both reliability and resistance to all known physicallayer distance reduction attacks against UWB 802.15.4z. We implement PURE within the EMV standard on modern smartphones, and evaluate its performance in a realistic deployment. Our experiments show that PURE provides a sub-meter relay protection with minimal execution overhead (41 ms). We formally verify the security of PURE's integration within Mastercard's EMV protocol using the Tamarin prover.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- When HTTP 402 Meets the Blockchain: Risks on Emerging x402 PaymentsQinying Wang, Yong Yang, Yuan Chen, Shouling Ji 等USENIX Security 2026
- LEO-Range: Physical Layer Design for Secure Ranging with Low Earth Orbiting SatellitesDaniele Coppola, Arslan Mumtaz, Giovanni Camurati, Harshad Sathaye 等USENIX Security 2025
- "Tap" Without Tapping: A Tag Discovery Forgery Attack on Android NFCYilin Li, Jianliang Wu, Chaoshun Zuo, Qingchuan Zhao 等USENIX Security 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, VerifyDavid A. Basin, Ralf Sasse, Jorge Toro-PozoS&P 2021 · 被引用 69 次
- Card Brand Mixup Attack: Bypassing the PIN in non-Visa Cards by Using Them for Visa TransactionsDavid A. Basin, Ralf Sasse, Jorge Toro-PozoUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 32 次
- Message Time of Arrival Codes: A Fundamental Primitive for Secure Distance MeasurementPatrick Leu, Mridula Singh, Marc Roeschlin, Kenneth G. Paterson 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 31 次
- Inducing Authentication Failures to Bypass Credit Card PINsDavid A. Basin, Patrick Schaller, Jorge Toro-PozoUSENIX Security 2023
- Ghost Peak: Practical Distance Reduction Attacks Against HRP UWB RangingPatrick Leu, Giovanni Camurati, Alexander Heinrich, Marc Roeschlin 等USENIX Security 2022
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