MACAO: A Maliciously-Secure and Client-Efficient Active ORAM Framework
Thang Hoang, Jorge Guajardo, Attila A. Yavuz
摘要
—Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) allows a client to hide the access pattern and thus, offers a strong level of privacy for data outsourcing. An ideal ORAM scheme is expected to offer desirable properties such as low client bandwidth, low server computation overhead and the ability to compute over encrypted data. S 3 ORAM (CCS’17) is an efficient active ORAM scheme, which takes advantage of secret sharing to provide ideal properties for data outsourcing such as low client bandwidth, low server computation and low delay. Despite its merits, S 3 ORAM only offers security in the semi-honest setting. In practice, an ORAM protocol is likely to operate in the presence of malicious adversaries who might deviate from the protocol to compromise the client privacy. In this paper, we propose MACAO , a new multi-server ORAM framework, which offers integrity, access pattern obliviousness against active adversaries, and the ability to perform secure computation over the accessed data. MACAO harnesses authenticated secret sharing techniques and tree-ORAM paradigm to achieve low client communication, efficient server computation, and low storage overhead at the same time. We fully implemented MACAO and conducted extensive experiments in real cloud platforms (Amazon EC2) to validate the performance of MACAO compared with the state-of-the-art. Our results indicate that MACAO can achieve comparable performance to S 3 ORAM while offering security against malicious adversaries. MACAO is a suitable candidate for integration into distributed file systems with encrypted computation capabilities towards enabling an oblivious functional data outsourcing infrastructure.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- MVP-ORAM: a Wait-free Concurrent ORAM for Confidential BFT StorageRobin Vassantlal, Hasan Heydari, Bernardo Ferreira, Alysson BessaniNDSS 2026
- Titanium: A Metadata-Hiding File-Sharing System with Malicious SecurityWeikeng Chen, Thang Hoang, Jorge Guajardo, Attila A. YavuzNDSS 2022
- DuetORAM: Two-Server Distributed ORAM with Constant Rounds and O(log N) CommunicationFeng Li, Xiangfu Song, Yingying Li, Lisha Yao 等USENIX Security 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper10
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- OBLIVIATE: A Data Oblivious Filesystem for Intel SGXAdil Ahmad, Kyungtae Kim, Muhammad Ihsanulhaq Sarfaraz, Byoungyoung LeeNDSS 2018 · 被引用 144 次
- TaoStore: Overcoming Asynchronicity in Oblivious Data StorageCetin Sahin, Victor Zakhary, Amr El Abbadi, Huijia Lin 等S&P 2016 · 被引用 98 次
- A Practical Oblivious Map Data Structure with Secure Deletion and History IndependenceDaniel S. Roche, Adam J. Aviv, Seung Geol ChoiS&P 2016 · 被引用 63 次
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