Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts
Lorenz Breidenbach, Philip Daian, Florian Tramèr, Ari Juels
摘要
Bug bounties are a popular tool to help prevent software exploits. Yet, they lack rigorous principles for setting bounty amounts and require high payments to attract economically rational hackers. Rather than claim bounties for serious bugs, hackers often sell or exploit them. We present the Hydra Framework, the first general, principled approach to modeling and administering bug bounties that incentivize bug disclosure. Our key idea is an exploit gap, a program transformation that enables runtime detection, and rewarding, of critical bugs. Our framework transforms programs via N-of-N-version programming, a variant of classical N-version programming that runs multiple independent program instances. We apply the Hydra Framework to smart contracts, small programs that execute on blockchains. We show how Hydra contracts greatly amplify the power of bounties to incentivize bug disclosure by economically rational adversaries, establishing the first framework for rigorous economic evaluation of smart contract security. We also model powerful adversaries capable of bug withholding, exploiting race conditions in blockchains to claim bounties before honest users can. We present Submarine Commitments, a countermeasure of independent interest that conceals transactions on blockchains. We design a simple, automated version of the Hydra Framework for Ethereum (ethereum.org) and implement two Hydra contracts, an ERC20 standard token and a Monty-Hall game. We evaluate our implementation for completeness and soundness with the official Ethereum virtual machine test suite and live blockchain data.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper19
- teEther: Gnawing at Ethereum to Automatically Exploit Smart ContractsJohannes Krupp, Christian RossowUSENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 345 次
- High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain ExchangesLiyi Zhou, Kaihua Qin, Christof Ferreira Torres, Duc Viet Le 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 243 次
- Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum BlockchainChristof Ferreira Torres, Ramiro Camino, Radu StateUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 179 次
- Redactable Blockchain in the Permissionless SettingDominic Deuber, Bernardo Magri, Sri Aravinda Krishnan ThyagarajanS&P 2019 · 被引用 153 次
- On the Just-In-Time Discovery of Profit-Generating Transactions in DeFi ProtocolsLiyi Zhou, Kaihua Qin, Antoine Cully, Benjamin Livshits 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 148 次
它引用的顶会 Paper2
相关 Paper
- The Art of The Scam: Demystifying Honeypots in Ethereum Smart ContractsChristof Ferreira Torres, Mathis Steichen, Radu StateUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 239 次
- SmartInv: Multimodal Learning for Smart Contract Invariant InferenceSally Junsong Wang, Kexin Pei, Junfeng YangS&P 2024 · 被引用 38 次
- A Mixed-Methods Study of Security Practices of Smart Contract DevelopersTanusree Sharma, Kyrie Zhixuan Zhou, Andrew Miller, Yang WangUSENIX Security 2023
- ZEUS: Analyzing Safety of Smart ContractsSukrit Kalra, Seep Goel, Mohan Dhawan, Subodh SharmaNDSS 2018 · 被引用 595 次
- SGUARD: Towards Fixing Vulnerable Smart Contracts AutomaticallyTai D. Nguyen, Long H. Pham, Jun SunS&P 2021 · 被引用 69 次
