Boosting Gas Revenues of Ethereum Miners
Togzhan Barakbayeva, Soroush Farokhnia, Amir K. Goharshady, Sergei Novozhilov
摘要
In cryptocurrency networks, transaction-fee revenue serves as the primary financial incentive for miners to participate in the consensus mechanism, securing the network by validating transactions and extending the blockchain. Maximizing this revenue is therefore a key optimization problem for miners. While this has been studied for UTXO blockchains like Bitcoin, where transaction fees are fixed, we focus on Ethereum, where the challenge is significantly greater. On Ethereum, the fee paid by a transaction depends on its execution cost (gas), which can change based on the ordering of preceding transactions in a block. This creates a combinatorial explosion, as miners must select not only a subset of transactions but also their optimal permutation to maximize revenue.
In this work, we present a randomized framework to address this problem. Our approach first uses randomized testing, executing sample permutations of pending transactions to profile their gas usage. From this data, we employ decision trees to learn transaction interdependencies, identifying a small "neighborhood" of transactions that influence each other's execution costs. These dependencies are then encoded as a set of logical rules that predict gas usage based on local transaction ordering. Finally, we translate these rules and other constraints (e.g., block gas limit, nonce ordering) into an integer linear programming (ILP) instance, which we solve to find a block composition that maximizes total tip revenue. Our experimental results demonstrate significant gains: our method outperforms real-world Ethereum miners by an average of 73.45 percent per block, which corresponds to roughly 63 million USD per annum.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- Making Smart Contracts SmarterLoi Luu, Duc-Hiep Chu, Hrishi Olickel, Prateek Saxena 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 2,306 次
- Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus InstabilityPhilip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 607 次
- High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain ExchangesLiyi Zhou, Kaihua Qin, Christof Ferreira Torres, Duc Viet Le 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 243 次
- Demystifying DeFi MEV Activities in Flashbots BundleZihao Li, Jianfeng Li, Zheyuan He, Xiapu Luo 等CCS 2023 · 被引用 29 次
- Asparagus: Automated Synthesis of Parametric Gas Upper-Bounds for Smart ContractsZhuo Cai, Soroush Farokhnia, Amir Kafshdar Goharshady, S. HitarthOOPSLA 2023 · 被引用 16 次
相关 Paper
- Auspex: Unveiling Inconsistency Bugs of Transaction Fee Mechanism in BlockchainZheyuan He, Zihao Li, Jiahao Luo, Feng Luo 等USENIX Security 2025
- Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus SecurityYulin Liu, Yuxuan Lu, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 78 次
- Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignHao Chung, Elaine ShiSODA 2023 · 被引用 53 次
- Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution UncertaintySarisht Wadhwa, Aviv Yaish, Fan Zhang, Kartik NayakUSENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 3 次
- Finding Consensus Bugs in Ethereum via Multi-transaction Differential FuzzingYoungseok Yang, Taesoo Kim, Byung-Gon ChunOSDI 2021 · 被引用 57 次
