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CRYPTO2025顶会

Reducing the Number of Qubits in Quantum Factoring

Clémence Chevignard, Pierre-Alain Fouque, André Schrottenloher

2025年份
8被引次数
3顶会引用

摘要

This paper focuses on the optimization of the number of logical qubits in quantum algorithms for factoring and computing discrete logarithms in ZN∗\mathbb{Z}_N^*. These algorithms contain an exponentiation circuit modulo NN, which is responsible for most of their cost, both in qubits and operations.

In this paper, we show that using only o(log⁡N)o(\log N) work qubits, one can obtain the least significant bits of the modular exponentiation output. We combine this result with May and Schlieper's truncation technique (ToSC 2022) and the Eker-Hstad variant of Shor's algorithm (PQCrypto 2017) to solve the discrete logarithm problem in ZN∗\mathbb{Z}_N^* using only d+o(log⁡N)d + o(\log N) qubits, where dd is the bit-size of the logarithm. Consequently we can factor nn-bit RSA moduli using n/2+o(n)n/2 + o(n) qubits, while current envisioned implementations require about 2n2n qubits.

Our algorithm uses a Residue Number System and succeeds with a parametrizable probability. Being completely classical, we have implemented and tested it. For RSA factorization, we can reach a gate count O(n3)\mathcal{O}(n^3) for a depth O(n2log⁡3n)\mathcal{O}(n^2 \log^3 n), which then has to be multiplied by O(log⁡n)\mathcal{O}(\log n) (the number of measurement results required by Eker-Hstad). To factor an RSA-2048 instance, we estimate that 1730 logical qubits and 2362^{36} Toffoli gates will suffice for a single run, and the algorithm needs on average 40 runs. To solve a discrete logarithm instance of 224 bits (112-bit classical security) in a safe-prime group of 2048 bits, we estimate that 684 logical qubits would suffice, and 20 runs with 2322^{32} Toffoli gates each.

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