Hold the Door! Fingerprinting Your Car Key to Prevent Keyless Entry Car Theft
Kyungho Joo, Wonsuk Choi, Dong Hoon Lee
摘要
Recently, the traditional way to unlock car doors has been replaced with a keyless entry system which proves more convenient for automobile owners. When a driver with a key fob is in the vicinity of the vehicle, doors automatically unlock on user command. However, unfortunately, it has been shown that these keyless entry systems are vulnerable to signal relaying attacks. While it is evident that automobile manufacturers incorporate preventative methods to secure these keyless entry systems, they continue to be vulnerable to a range of attacks. Relayed signals result in valid packets that are verified as legitimate, and this makes it is difficult to distinguish a legitimate door unlock request from a malicious signal. In response to this vulnerability, this paper presents an RF fingerprinting method (coined HOld the DOoR, HODOR) to detect attacks on keyless entry systems the first attempt to exploit the RF fingerprint technique in the automotive domain. HODOR is designed as a sub authentication method that supports existing authentication systems for keyless entry systems and does not require any modification of the main system to perform. Through a series of experiments, the results demonstrate that HODOR competently and reliably detects attacks on keyless entry systems. HODOR achieves both an average false positive rate (FPR) of 0.27 percent with a false negative rate (FNR) of 0 percent for the detection of simulated attacks, corresponding to current research on keyless entry car theft.
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引用它的顶会 Paper2
- From Hardware Fingerprint to Access Token: Enhancing the Authentication on IoT DevicesYue Xiao, Yi He, Xiaoli Zhang, Qian Wang 等NDSS 2024
- Spatial-Domain Wireless Jamming with Reconfigurable Intelligent SurfacesPhilipp Mackensen, Paul Staat, Stefan Roth, Aydin Sezgin 等NDSS 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Lock It and Still Lose It - on the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry SystemsFlavio D. Garcia, David F. Oswald, Timo Kasper, Pierre PavlidèsUSENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 151 次
- UWB with Pulse Reordering: Securing Ranging against Relay and Physical-Layer AttacksMridula Singh, Patrick Leu, Srdjan CapkunNDSS 2019 · 被引用 57 次
- UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-WidebandMridula Singh, Patrick Leu, AbdelRahman Abdou, Srdjan CapkunUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 35 次
- Message Time of Arrival Codes: A Fundamental Primitive for Secure Distance MeasurementPatrick Leu, Mridula Singh, Marc Roeschlin, Kenneth G. Paterson 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 31 次
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