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ICML2026顶会

Bandit Social Leaning Dynamics with Exploration Episodes

Kiarash Banihashem, Natalie Collina, Alex Slivkins

2026年份
1被引次数

摘要

We study a stylized social learning dynamics where self-interested agents collectively follow a simple multi-armed bandit protocol. Each agent controls an "episode": a short sequence of consecutive decisions. Motivating applications include users repeatedly interacting with an AI, or repeatedly shopping at a marketplace. While agents are incentivized to explore within their respective episodes, we show that the aggregate exploration fails: e.g., its Bayesian regret grows linearly over time. In fact, such failure is a (very) typical case, not just a worst-case scenario. This conclusion persists even if an agent's per-episode utility is some fixed function of the per-round outcomes: e.g., min⁡\min or max⁡\max, not just the sum. Thus, externally driven exploration is needed even when some amount of exploration happens organically.

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