VIP: Safeguard Value Invariant Property for Thwarting Critical Memory Corruption Attacks
Mohannad Ismail, Jinwoo Yom, Christopher Jelesnianski, Yeongjin Jang, Changwoo Min
摘要
Most modern software attacks are rooted in memory corruption vulnerabilities, which are capable of altering security-sensitive data (e.g., function pointers) to unintended values. This paper introduces a new security property, the Value Invariant Property (VIP), and HyperSpace, our prototype that enforces VIP on security-sensitive data. HyperSpace safeguards the integrity of "data values" instead of enforcing control/data flow, allowing for low runtime overhead, yet defeating critical attacks effectively. We implement four representative security policies including Control Flow Integrity (VIP-CFI), Code Pointer Integrity (VIP-CPI), Virtual function Table protection (VIP-VTPtr), and heap metadata protection based on HyperSpace. We evaluate HyperSpace with SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and real-world applications (NGINX and PostgreSQL) and test how HyperSpace defeats memory corruption-based attacks, including three real-world exploits and six attacks that bypass existing defenses (COOP, heap exploits, etc.). Our experimental evaluation shows that HyperSpace successfully stops all these attacks with low runtime overhead: 0.88% and 6.18% average performance overhead for VIP-CFI and VIP-CPI, respectively, and overall approximately 13.18% memory overhead with VIP-CPI in SPEC CPU2006.
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