Lune

NeurIPS2024顶会

Fast Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games Requires Forgetful Algorithms

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee, Haipeng Luo, Weiqiang Zheng

2024年份
24被引次数
10顶会引用

摘要

Self-play via online learning is one of the premier ways to solve large-scale two-player zero-sum games, both in theory and practice. Particularly popular algorithms include optimistic multiplicative weights update (OMWU) and optimistic gradient-descent-ascent (OGDA). While both algorithms enjoy O(1/T)O(1/T) ergodic convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, OMWU offers several advantages including logarithmic dependence on the size of the payoff matrix and O~(1/T)\widetilde{O}(1/T) convergence to coarse correlated equilibria even in general-sum games. However, in terms of last-iterate convergence in two-player zero-sum games, an increasingly popular topic in this area, OGDA guarantees that the duality gap shrinks at a rate of O(1/T)O(1/\sqrt{T}), while the best existing last-iterate convergence for OMWU depends on some game-dependent constant that could be arbitrarily large. This begs the question: is this potentially slow last-iterate convergence an inherent disadvantage of OMWU, or is the current analysis too loose? Somewhat surprisingly, we show that the former is true. More generally, we prove that a broad class of algorithms that do not forget the past quickly all suffer the same issue: for any arbitrarily small δ>0\delta>0, there exists a 2×22\times 2 matrix game such that the algorithm admits a constant duality gap even after 1/δ1/\delta rounds. This class of algorithms includes OMWU and other standard optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader algorithms.

问问这篇 Paper

智能体会读完全文。

Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。

可以从这些问题问起

智能体调用

Luneget_paper_fulltext

在 Lune 里问

免费开始,无需绑卡

引用它的顶会 Paper10

问问它们各自怎么用它

它引用的顶会 Paper13

相关 Paper

黄昏的海面,两侧是细线勾勒的悬崖