ARuleCon: Agentic Security Rule Conversion
Ming Xu, Hongtai Wang, Yanpei Guo, Zhengmin Yu, Weili Han, Hoon Wei Lim, Jin Song Dong, Jiaheng Zhang
摘要
The real-time demand for web security makes Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms and their applied security rule an integral part of the intrusion detection life-cycle. However, the heterogeneity of vendor-specific rules (e.g., Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, IBM AQL, Google YARA-L, and RSA ESA) makes cross-platform rule reuse extremely difficult, requiring deep domain knowledge for reliable conversion. As a result, an autonomous and accurate rule conversion framework can significantly lead to effort savings, preserving the value of existing rules. In this paper, we propose ARuleCon, an agentic SIEM-rule conversion approach. Using ARuleCon, the security professionals do not need to distill the source rules' logic and re-map it to target vendors, instead, they provide the source rules, the documentation of the target rules and ARuleCon can purposely convert to the target vendors without more intervention. To achieve this, ARuleCon is equipped with intermediate representation (IR) that aligns core detection logic into vendor-neutral layer, agentic RAG pipeline that retrieves authoritative official vendor documentation to address the convension/schema mismatches, and Python-based consistency check that running both source and target rules in controlled test environments to mitigate subtle semantic drifts. We present a comprehensive evaluation of ARuleCon ranging from textual alignment between the source and target rules, and the execution success of target rules, showcasing ARuleCon can convert rules with higher fidelity, outperforming the baseline LLM models by 15% averagely. Finally, we perform a case study and interview with our industry collaborators 1, which showcases that ARuleCon can significantly save the expert's time on understanding the cross-SIEM's documentation and remapping the logic.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper2
- Agentic Verification of Software SystemsHaoxin Tu, Huan Zhao, Yahui Song, Mehtab Zafar 等FSE 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- AliMark: Enhancing Robustness of Sentence-Level Watermarking Against Text ParaphrasingYuexin Li, Wenjie Qu, Linyu Wu, Yulin Chen 等ICML 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper7
- Tactical Provenance Analysis for Endpoint Detection and Response SystemsWajih Ul Hassan, Adam Bates, Daniel MarinoS&P 2020 · 被引用 317 次
- SWE-RL: Advancing LLM Reasoning via Reinforcement Learning on Open Software EvolutionYuxiang Wei, Olivier Duchenne, Jade Copet, Quentin Carbonneaux 等NeurIPS 2025 · 被引用 291 次
- Kairos: Practical Intrusion Detection and Investigation using Whole-system ProvenanceZijun Cheng, Qiujian Lv, Jinyuan Liang, Yan Wang 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 125 次
- Flash: A Comprehensive Approach to Intrusion Detection via Provenance Graph Representation LearningMati Ur Rehman, Hadi Ahmadi, Wajih Ul HassanS&P 2024 · 被引用 104 次
- You Cannot Escape Me: Detecting Evasions of SIEM Rules in Enterprise NetworksRafael Uetz, Marco Herzog, Louis Hackländer, Simon Schwarz 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 23 次
相关 Paper
- RulePilot: An LLM-Powered Agent for Security Rule GenerationHongtai Wang, Ming Xu, Yanpei Guo, Weili Han 等ICSE 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Catch Me If You Can: Detector-Resistant Evasion via Semantics-Preserving Command Re-RealizationMuhammad Shoaib, Hare Sudhan Muthusamy, Tareq Alkhatib, Wajih Ul HassanS&P 2026 · 被引用 2 次
- Transfer Rule Learning over Large Knowledge GraphsHong Liu, Zhe Wang, Kewen Wang, Xiaowang Zhang 等WWW 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- Credible Threat Detection? Measuring Contribution Dynamics and Quality Control in a Crowdsourced Threat Detection EcosystemApurva Virkud, Gang Wang, Adam BatesUSENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- How does Endpoint Detection use the MITRE ATT&CK Framework?Apurva Virkud, Muhammad Adil Inam, Andy Riddle, Jason Liu 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 9 次
