SoK: Analysis of Accelerator TEE Designs
Chenxu Wang, Junjie Huang, Yujun Liang, Xuanyao Peng, Yuqun Zhang, Fengwei Zhang, Jiannong Cao, Hang Lu, Rui Hou, Shoumeng Yan, Tao Wei, Zhengyu He
摘要
—Accelerator trusted execution environment (TEE) is a popular technique that provides strong confidentiality, integrity, and isolation protection on sensitive data/code in accelerators. However, most studies are designed for a specific CPU or accelerator and thus lack generalizability. Recent TEE surveys partially summarize the threats and protections of accelerator computing, while they have yet to provide a guide to building an accelerator TEE and compare the pros and cons of their security solutions. In this paper, we provide a holistic analysis of accelerator TEEs over the years. We conclude a typical framework of building an accelerator TEE and summarize the widely-used attack vectors, ranging from software to physical attacks. Furthermore, we provide a systematization of accelerator TEE’s three major security mechanisms: (1) access control, (2) memory encryption/decryption, and (3) attestation. For each aspect, we compare varied security solutions in existing studies and conclude their insights. Lastly, we analyze the factors that influence the TEE deployment on real-world platforms, especially on the trusted computing base (TCB) and compatibility issues.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了最后一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper51
- Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environmentsDayeol Lee, David Kohlbrenner, Shweta Shinde, Krste Asanovic 等EuroSys 2020 · 被引用 381 次
- EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGXChristian Priebe, Kapil Vaswani, Manuel CostaS&P 2018 · 被引用 329 次
- SoK: Understanding the Prevailing Security Vulnerabilities in TrustZone-assisted TEE SystemsDavid Cerdeira, Nuno Santos, Pedro Fonseca, Sandro PintoS&P 2020 · 被引用 231 次
- CURE: A Security Architecture with CUstomizable and Resilient EnclavesRaad Bahmani, Ferdinand Brasser, Ghada Dessouky, Patrick Jauernig 等USENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 150 次
- BITE: Bitcoin Lightweight Client Privacy using Trusted ExecutionSinisa Matetic, Karl Wüst, Moritz Schneider, Kari Kostiainen 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 109 次
相关 Paper
- TEEM³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution EnvironmentsNils Asmussen, Sebastian Haas, Carsten Weinhold, Nicholas Gordon 等ASPLOS 2026
- AccShield: a New Trusted Execution Environment with Machine-Learning AcceleratorsWei Ren, William Kozlowski, Sandhya Koteshwara, Mengmei Ye 等DAC 2023 · 被引用 11 次
- ACAI: Protecting Accelerator Execution with Arm Confidential Computing ArchitectureSupraja Sridhara, Andrin Bertschi, Benedict Schlüter, Mark Kuhne 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 36 次
- StrongBox: A GPU TEE on Arm EndpointsYunjie Deng, Chenxu Wang, Shunchang Yu, Shiqing Liu 等CCS 2022 · 被引用 37 次
- MOLE: Breaking GPU TEE with GPU-Embedded MCUHongyi Lu, Yunjie Deng, J. Sukarno Mertoguno, Shuai Wang 等CCS 2025
