FlowMur: A Stealthy and Practical Audio Backdoor Attack with Limited Knowledge
Jiahe Lan, Jie Wang, Baochen Yan, Zheng Yan, Elisa Bertino
摘要
Speech recognition systems driven by Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have revolutionized human-computer interaction through voice interfaces, which significantly facilitate our daily lives. However, the growing popularity of these systems also raises special concerns on their security, particularly regarding backdoor attacks. A backdoor attack inserts one or more hidden backdoors into a DNN model during its training process, such that it does not affect the model’s performance on benign inputs, but forces the model to produce an adversary-desired output if a specific trigger is present in the model input. Despite the initial success of current audio backdoor attacks, they suffer from the following limitations: (i) Most of them require sufficient knowledge, which limits their widespread adoption. (ii) They are not stealthy enough, thus easy to be detected by humans. (iii) Most of them cannot attack live speech, reducing their practicality. To address these problems, in this paper, we propose FlowMur, a stealthy and practical audio backdoor attack that can be launched with limited knowledge. FlowMur constructs an auxiliary dataset and a surrogate model to augment adversary knowledge. To achieve dynamicity, it formulates trigger generation as an optimization problem and optimizes the trigger over different attachment positions. To enhance stealthiness, we propose an adaptive data poisoning method according to Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). Furthermore, ambient noise is incorporated into the process of trigger generation and data poisoning to make FlowMur robust to ambient noise and improve its practicality. Extensive experiments conducted on two datasets demonstrate that FlowMur achieves high attack performance in both digital and physical settings while remaining resilient to state-of- the-art defenses. In particular, a human study confirms that triggers generated by FlowMur are not easily detected by participants. The source code of FlowMur is publicly available at https://github.com/cristinalan/FlowMur.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- Hidden in the Noise: Unveiling Backdoors in Audio LLMs Alignment Through Latent Acoustic Pattern TriggersLiang Lin, Miao Yu, Kaiwen Luo, Yibo Zhang 等AAAI 2026 · 被引用 5 次
- LADDER: Multi-Objective Backdoor Attack via Evolutionary AlgorithmDazhuang Liu, Yanqi Qiao, Rui Wang, Kaitai Liang 等NDSS 2025
- TrojanWave: Exploiting Prompt Learning for Stealthy Backdoor Attacks on Large Audio-Language ModelsAsif Hanif, Maha Tufail Agro, Fahad Shamshad, Karthik NandakumarEMNLP 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper17
- HiFi-GAN: Generative Adversarial Networks for Efficient and High Fidelity Speech SynthesisJungil Kong, Jaehyeon Kim, Jaekyoung BaeNeurIPS 2020 · 被引用 2,890 次
- Trojaning Attack on Neural NetworksYingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee 等NDSS 2018 · 被引用 1,377 次
- Turning Your Weakness Into a Strength: Watermarking Deep Neural Networks by BackdooringYossi Adi, Carsten Baum, Moustapha Cissé, Benny Pinkas 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 832 次
- Hidden Voice CommandsNicholas Carlini, Pratyush Mishra, Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 672 次
- Why Do Adversarial Attacks Transfer? Explaining Transferability of Evasion and Poisoning AttacksAmbra Demontis, Marco Melis, Maura Pintor, Matthew Jagielski 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 466 次
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