Abuse Reporting and Enforcement for Third Party Moderators in Private Messaging
Matthew Gregoire, Jade Keegan, Saba Eskandarian
摘要
We introduce new techniques for verifiable reporting of abusive messages in private messaging platforms. Our techniques are compatible with both metadata-hiding messaging systems, where the platform does not know who speaks to whom, and with third-party moderation, where the platform is not involved in the process of verifying or judging reported content.
While prior work in this space considers the question of how a moderator would verify reports, prior works do not address the question of how a moderator and platform would collaborate to enforce moderation decisions. In a setting where the platform does not wish to be involved in or responsible for enforcing moderation decisions, or in federated settings where it is not clear who would be responsible for enforcement, this presents an additional challenge.
Our work solves this problem with a lightweight credentialing and revocation mechanism that does not involve the platform in moderation enforcement at all. In order to support this added functionality, we build on Asymmetric Message Franking (Crypto '19) and improve performance over the original scheme, reducing moderator computation and communication costs to verify reports by and , respectively.
问问这篇 Paper
问问你的智能体。
Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。
相关 Paper
- Abuse Reporting for Metadata-Hiding Communication Based on Secret SharingSaba EskandarianUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 9 次
- Onion Franking: Abuse Reports for Mix-Based Private MessagingMatthew Gregoire, Margaret Pierce, Saba EskandarianNDSS 2025
- Hecate: Abuse Reporting in Secure Messengers with Sealed SenderRawane Issa, Nicolas Alhaddad, Mayank VariaUSENIX Security 2022
- Interoperable Symmetric Message FrankingCarolina Ortega Pérez, Thomas Ristenpart, Julia LenCCS 2025
- Asymmetric Message Franking in the Plain Model: Generic and Efficient ConstructionsMilan Gonzalez-Thauvin, Keitaro HashimotoCRYPTO 2026
