Towards Predicting Efficient and Anonymous Tor Circuits
Armon Barton, Matthew Wright, Jiang Ming, Mohsen Imani
摘要
The Tor anonymity system provides online privacy for millions of users, but it is slower than typical web browsing. To improve Tor performance, we propose PredicTor, a path selection technique that uses a Random Forest classifier trained on recent measurements of Tor to predict the performance of a proposed path. If the path is predicted to be fast, then the client builds a circuit using those relays. We implemented PredicTor in the Tor source code and show through live Tor experiments and Shadow simulations that PredicTor improves Tor network performance by 11% to 23% compared to Vanilla Tor and by 7% to 13% compared to the previous state-of-the-art scheme. Our experiments show that PredicTor is the first path selection algorithm to dynamically avoid highly congested nodes during times of high congestion and avoid long-distance paths during times of low congestion. We evaluate the anonymity of PredicTor using standard entropy-based and time-to-first-compromise metrics, but these cannot capture the possibility of leakage due to the use of location in path selection. To better address this, we propose a new anonymity metric called CLASI: Client Autonomous System Inference. CLASI is the first anonymity metric in Tor that measures an adversary's ability to infer client Autonomous Systems (ASes) by fingerprinting circuits at the network, country, and relay level. We find that CLASI shows anonymity loss for location-aware path selection algorithms, where entropy-based metrics show little to no loss of anonymity. Additionally, CLASI indicates that PredicTor has similar sender AS leakage compared to the current Tor path selection algorithm due to PredicTor building circuits that are independent of client location.
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引用它的顶会 Paper7
- CLAPS: Client-Location-Aware Path Selection in TorFlorentin Rochet, Ryan Wails, Aaron Johnson, Prateek Mittal 等CCS 2020 · 被引用 23 次
- "Get in Researchers; We're Measuring Reproducibility": A Reproducibility Study of Machine Learning Papers in Tier 1 Security ConferencesDaniel Olszewski, Allison Lu, Carson Stillman, Kevin Warren 等CCS 2023 · 被引用 19 次
- ShorTor: Improving Tor Network Latency via Multi-hop Overlay RoutingKyle Hogan, Sacha Servan-Schreiber, Zachary Newman, Ben Weintraub 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 17 次
- OptiMix: Scalable and Distributed Approaches for Latency Optimization in Modern MixnetsMahdi RahimiNDSS 2026 · 被引用 3 次
- SaTor: Exploring Satellite Routing in Tor to Reduce LatencyHaozhi Li, Tariq ElahiS&P 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Measuring and Mitigating AS-level Adversaries Against TorRishab Nithyanand, Oleksii Starov, Phillipa Gill, Adva Zair 等NDSS 2016 · 被引用 79 次
- Safely Measuring TorRob Jansen, Aaron JohnsonCCS 2016 · 被引用 76 次
- Counter-RAPTOR: Safeguarding Tor Against Active Routing AttacksYixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Nick Feamster, Mung Chiang 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 60 次
- Avoiding The Man on the Wire: Improving Tor's Security with Trust-Aware Path SelectionAaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, Aaron D. Jaggard, Joan Feigenbaum 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 30 次
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