First Price Auction is 1 - 1 /e2 Efficient
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu
2022年份
3被引次数
10顶会引用
摘要
We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].
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引用它的顶会 Paper10
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- Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, RevisitedYiding Feng, Yaonan JinFOCS 2025 · 被引用 6 次
- First-Order (Coarse) Correlated Equilibria in Non-concave GamesMete Seref AhunbaySTOC 2026 · 被引用 6 次
- Proximal Regret and Proximal Correlated Equilibria: A New Tractable Solution Concept for Online Learning and GamesYang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei 等STOC 2026 · 被引用 5 次
- Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking RulesXi Chen, Binghui PengSTOC 2023 · 被引用 3 次
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