MinBucket MPSI: Breaking the Max-Size Bottleneck in Multi-Party Private Set Intersection
Binbin Tu, Boyudong Zhu, Yang Cao, Yu Chen
摘要
Multi-Party Private Set Intersection (Cardinality) protocol enables parties, each holding a private set, to jointly compute the intersection (or its cardinality) without revealing any additional information to other parties. To date, all known MPSI (MPSI-Card) protocols require communication complexity that scales linearly with the size of the large set, fundamentally precluding their efficient deployment in real-world applications with heterogeneous input scales. In this work, we present a new framework for MPSI based on newly proposed protocols: batched membership conditional randomness generation and joint private equality test. By instantiating this framework, we develop two MPSI protocols with communication complexities that are linear in the size of the small set and logarithmic in the size of the large set. One protocol offers security against an arbitrary number of colluding parties, while the other secures against colluding parties. Additionally, we develop a protocol called the joint permuted private equality test and propose the MPSI-Card framework. By instantiating this framework, we derive an MPSI-Card protocol with similar communication efficiency: linear in the small set and logarithmic in the large set, providing security against an arbitrary number of colluding parties. We implement our protocols and conduct extensive experiments over both LAN and WAN networks. Experimental results demonstrate that our protocols achieve significantly better performance as the size difference between the sets or the number of participants holding the small set increases. For the setting, where parties holding large set (size ) and parties holding small set (size ) with a single thread and a Mbps bandwidth, our MPSI (MPSI-Card) protocol requires only () MB of communication and () seconds of runtime. Compared with the state-of-the-art MPSI by Wu et al. (USENIX Security 2024) and MPSI-Card by Gao et al. (PETS 2024), our protocol achieves a reduction in communication cost and a speedup in runtime.
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它引用的顶会 Paper19
- Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic EncryptionHao Chen, Kim Laine, Peter RindalCCS 2017 · 被引用 446 次
- Efficient Batched Oblivious PRF with Applications to Private Set IntersectionVladimir Kolesnikov, Ranjit Kumaresan, Mike Rosulek, Ni TrieuCCS 2016 · 被引用 429 次
- Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key TechniquesVladimir Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 247 次
- Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious SecurityHao Chen, Zhicong Huang, Kim Laine, Peter RindalCCS 2018 · 被引用 242 次
- PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set IntersectionBenny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu, Avishay YanaiEUROCRYPT 2020 · 被引用 198 次
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