SafeGuard: Reducing the Security Risk from Row-Hammer via Low-Cost Integrity Protection
Ali Fakhrzadehgan, Yale N. Patt, Prashant J. Nair, Moinuddin K. Qureshi
摘要
Row-Hammer (RH) is a DRAM data-disturbance failure that occurs when a row is activated frequently, which causes bit-flips in nearby rows. Row-Hammer is a significant security threat as an attacker can exploit the bit-flips to do privilege escalation and leak confidential data. While several solutions aim to mitigate RH, such solutions depend on the RH threshold and adversarial access patterns. Solutions developed for a given threshold become ineffective for newer devices with lower thresholds, and new attack patterns continue to break existing mitigations. Currently, there is no guaranteed solution for RH, which means that the system remains vulnerable to security threats even in the presence of RH mitigation.
In this paper, we contend that simply relying on RH mitigation is insufficient to provide security in the presence of reducing threshold and motivated attackers. We propose SafeGuard, which equips the system with low-cost integrity protection as a defense against potential attacks that break the RH mitigation. As SafeGuard can detect arbitrary failures, it converts the problem of RH bit-flips from a security threat (silent consumption of corrupted data) to a reliability concern (detectable uncorrectable errors caused by integrity violation). We develop SafeGuard for systems that employ ECC modules and show that SafeGuard can provide strong detection to both SECDED (46-bit MAC per cache-line) and Chipkill (32-bit MAC per cache-line) while retaining the correction capability of conventional designs. SafeGuard avoids incurring any storage overheads in DRAM by simply reorganizing the ECC code to operate at a cache-line granularity (64 bytes) instead of a word granularity (8 bytes). Our evaluations show that SafeGuard has a negligible impact on both the system performance (0.7%) and the system reliability due to naturally occurring errors while still providing a strong defense against the security risk of RH by detecting arbitrary bit-flips.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper40
- Randomized row-swap: mitigating Row Hammer by breaking spatial correlation between aggressor and victim rowsGururaj Saileshwar, Bolin Wang, Moinuddin K. Qureshi, Prashant J. NairASPLOS 2022 · 被引用 78 次
- Hydra: enabling low-overhead mitigation of row-hammer at ultra-low thresholds via hybrid trackingMoinuddin K. Qureshi, Aditya Rohan, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant J. NairISCA 2022 · 被引用 60 次
- Scalable and Secure Row-Swap: Efficient and Safe Row Hammer Mitigation in Memory SystemsJeonghyun Woo, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant J. NairHPCA 2023 · 被引用 45 次
- MOESI-prime: preventing coherence-induced hammering in commodity workloadsKevin Loughlin, Stefan Saroiu, Alec Wolman, Yatin A. Manerkar 等ISCA 2022 · 被引用 34 次
- ABACuS: All-Bank Activation Counters for Scalable and Low Overhead RowHammer MitigationAtaberk Olgun, Yahya Can Tugrul, Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yuksel 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 29 次
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer DefensesDaniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 288 次
- TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row RefreshPietro Frigo, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 274 次
- RAMBleed: Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing ThemAndrew Kwong, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Yuval YaromS&P 2020 · 被引用 239 次
- Exploiting Correcting Codes: On the Effectiveness of ECC Memory Against Rowhammer AttacksLucian Cojocar, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert BosS&P 2019 · 被引用 233 次
- Revisiting RowHammer: An Experimental Analysis of Modern DRAM Devices and Mitigation TechniquesJeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Abdullah Giray Yaglikçi, Hasan Hassan 等ISCA 2020 · 被引用 161 次
相关 Paper
- AQUA: Scalable Rowhammer Mitigation by Quarantining Aggressor Rows at RuntimeAnish Saxena, Gururaj Saileshwar, Prashant J. Nair, Moinuddin K. QureshiMICRO 2022 · 被引用 57 次
- RowArmor: Efficient and Comprehensive Protection Against DRAM Disturbance AttacksMinbok Wi, Yoonyul Yoo, Yoojin Kim, Jaeho Shin 等ASPLOS 2026 · 被引用 3 次
- SHADOW: Preventing Row Hammer in DRAM with Intra-Subarray Row ShufflingMinbok Wi, Jaehyun Park, Seoyoung Ko, Michael Jaemin Kim 等HPCA 2023 · 被引用 41 次
- BreakHammer: Enhancing RowHammer Mitigations by Carefully Throttling Suspect ThreadsOguzhan Canpolat, A. Giray Yaglikçi, Ataberk Olgun, Ismail Emir Yuksel 等MICRO 2024 · 被引用 19 次
- BlockHammer: Preventing RowHammer at Low Cost by Blacklisting Rapidly-Accessed DRAM RowsAbdullah Giray Yaglikçi, Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim, Roknoddin Azizi 等HPCA 2021 · 被引用 124 次
