RealSWATT: Remote Software-based Attestation for Embedded Devices under Realtime Constraints
Sebastian Surminski, Christian Niesler, Ferdinand Brasser, Lucas Davi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
摘要
Smart factories, critical infrastructures, and medical devices largely rely on embedded systems that need to satisfy realtime constraints to complete crucial tasks. Recent studies and reports have revealed that many of these devices suffer from crucial vulnerabilities that can be exploited with fatal consequences. Despite the security and safety-critical role of these devices, they often do not feature stateof-the-art security mechanisms. Moreover, since realtime systems have strict timing requirements, integrating new security mechanisms is not a viable option as they often influence the device's runtime behavior. One solution is to offload security enhancements to a remote instance, the so-called remote attestation.
We present RealSWATT, the first software-based remote attestation system for realtime embedded devices. Remote attestation is a powerful security service that allows a party to verify the correct functionality of an untrusted remote device. In contrast to previous remote attestation approaches for realtime systems, RealSWATT does neither require custom hardware extensions nor trusted computing components. It is designed to work within real-world IoT networks, connected through Wi-Fi. RealSWATT leverages a dedicated processor core for remote attestation and provides the required timing guarantees without hardware extensions.
We implement RealSWATT on the popular ESP32 microcontroller, and we evaluate it on a real-world medical device with realtime constraints. To demonstrate its applicability, we furthermore integrate RealSWATT into a framework for off-the-shelf IoT devices and apply it to a smart plug, a smoke detector, and a smart light bulb.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper4
- PEARTS: Provable Execution in Real-Time Embedded SystemsAntonio Joia Neto, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ivan De Oliveira NunesS&P 2025
- ARI: Attestation of Real-time Mission Execution IntegrityJinwen Wang, Yujie Wang, Ao Li, Yang Xiao 等USENIX Security 2023
- ACFA: Secure Runtime Auditing & Guaranteed Device Healing via Active Control Flow AttestationAdam Caulfield, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ivan De Oliveira NunesUSENIX Security 2023
- IDA: Hybrid Attestation with Support for Interrupts and TOCTOUFatemeh Arkannezhad, Justin Feng, Nader SehatbakhshNDSS 2024
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT DeploymentsOmar Alrawi, Chaz Lever, Manos Antonakakis, Fabian MonroseS&P 2019 · 被引用 411 次
- C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems SoftwareTigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi, Jan-Erik Ekberg 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 311 次
- An Experimental Security Analysis of an Industrial Robot ControllerDavide Quarta, Marcello Pogliani, Mario Polino, Federico Maggi 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 169 次
- VRASED: A Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote AttestationIvan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Michael Steiner 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 135 次
- HERA: Hotpatching of Embedded Real-time ApplicationsChristian Niesler, Sebastian Surminski, Lucas DaviNDSS 2021
相关 Paper
- OAT: Attesting Operation Integrity of Embedded DevicesZhichuang Sun, Bo Feng, Long Lu, Somesh JhaS&P 2020 · 被引用 89 次
- SANA: Secure and Scalable Aggregate Network AttestationMoreno Ambrosin, Mauro Conti, Ahmad Ibrahim, Gregory Neven 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 162 次
- APEX: A Verified Architecture for Proofs of Execution on Remote Devices under Full Software CompromiseIvan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene TsudikUSENIX Security 2020
- On the TOCTOU Problem in Remote AttestationIvan De Oliveira Nunes, Sashidhar Jakkamsetti, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene TsudikCCS 2021 · 被引用 2 次
- Aion: Enabling Open Systems through Strong Availability Guarantees for EnclavesFritz Alder, Jo Van Bulck, Frank Piessens, Jan Tobias MühlbergCCS 2021 · 被引用 21 次
