The Benefits of Vulnerability Discovery and Bug Bounty Programs: Case Studies of Chromium and Firefox
Soodeh Atefi, Amutheezan Sivagnanam, Afiya Ayman, Jens Grossklags, Aron Laszka
摘要
Recently, bug-bounty programs have gained popularity and become a significant part of the security culture of many organizations. Bug-bounty programs enable organizations to enhance their security posture by harnessing the diverse expertise of crowds of external security experts (i.e., bug hunters). Nonetheless, quantifying the benefits of bug-bounty programs remains elusive, which presents a significant challenge for managing them. Previous studies focused on measuring their benefits in terms of the number of vulnerabilities reported or based on the properties of the reported vulnerabilities, such as severity or exploitability. However, beyond these inherent properties, the value of a report also depends on the probability that the vulnerability would be discovered by a threat actor before an internal expert could discover and patch it. In this paper, we present a data-driven study of the Chromium and Firefox vulnerability-reward programs. First, we estimate the difficulty of discovering a vulnerability using the probability of rediscovery as a novel metric. Our findings show that vulnerability discovery and patching provide clear benefits by making it difficult for threat actors to find vulnerabilities; however, we also identify opportunities for improvement, such as incentivizing bug hunters to focus more on development releases. Second, we compare the types of vulnerabilities that are discovered internally vs. externally and those that are exploited by threat actors. We observe significant differences between vulnerabilities found by external bug hunters, internal security teams, and external threat actors, which indicates that bug-bounty programs provide an important benefit by complementing the expertise of internal teams, but also that external hunters should be incentivized more to focus on the types of vulnerabilities that are likely to be exploited by threat actors. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy; Software and application security; • Information systems → Browsers; World Wide Web.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper4
- "Oh, what people would do with my knife?'' Navigating the Dual-Use Dilemma in PoC Exploit Development, Disclosure, and Community DynamicsArwa Al Alsadi, Lorenz Kustosch, Lamya Alowain, Michel Van Eeten 等USENIX Security 2026
- Bug Hunters' Perspectives on the Challenges and Benefits of the Bug Bounty EcosystemOmer Akgul, Taha Eghtesad, Amit Elazari, Omprakash Gnawali 等USENIX Security 2023
- A Deep Dive into How Open-Source Project Maintainers Review and Resolve Bug Bounty ReportsJessy Ayala, Steven Ngo, Joshua GarciaS&P 2025
- Vulnerability, Where Art Thou? An Investigation of Vulnerability Management in Android Smartphone ChipsetsDaniel Klischies, Philipp Mackensen, Veelasha MoonsamyNDSS 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper3
- Hackers vs. Testers: A Comparison of Software Vulnerability Discovery ProcessesDaniel Votipka, Rock Stevens, Elissa M. Redmiles, Jeremy Hu 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 151 次
- Bug Hunters' Perspectives on the Challenges and Benefits of the Bug Bounty EcosystemOmer Akgul, Taha Eghtesad, Amit Elazari, Omprakash Gnawali 等USENIX Security 2023
- Vulnerability Discovery for All: Experiences of Marginalization in Vulnerability DiscoveryKelsey R. Fulton, Samantha Katcher, Kevin Song, Marshini Chetty 等S&P 2023
相关 Paper
- Economic Factors of Vulnerability Trade and ExploitationLuca AllodiCCS 2017 · 被引用 82 次
- An Interview Study on Third-Party Cyber Threat Hunting Processes in the U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityWilliam P. Maxam III, James C. DavisUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 14 次
- Study Club, Labor Union or Start-Up? Characterizing Teams and Collaboration in the Bug Bounty EcosystemYangheran Piao, Temima Hrle, Daniel W. Woods, Ross AndersonS&P 2025
- Beyond the Surface: Towards Feature-Driven Fuzzing on the Chrome BrowserChaoyuan Peng, Muhui Jiang, Yajin Zhou, Lei WuISSTA 2026
- Understanding the Reproducibility of Crowd-reported Security VulnerabilitiesDongliang Mu, Alejandro Cuevas, Limin Yang, Hang Hu 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 138 次
