Labeled PSI from Homomorphic Encryption with Reduced Computation and Communication
Kelong Cong, Radames Cruz Moreno, Mariana Botelho da Gama, Wei Dai, Ilia Iliashenko, Kim Laine, Michael Rosenberg
摘要
It is known that fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can be used to build efficient (labeled) Private Set Intersection protocols in the unbalanced setting, where one of the sets is much larger than the other (Chen et al. (CCS'17, CCS'18)). In this paper we demonstrate multiple algorithmic improvements upon these works. In particular, our protocol has an asymptotically better computation cost, requiring only O( |X|) homomorphic multiplications, and communication complexity sublinear in the larger set size |X|. We demonstrate that our protocol is significantly better than that of Chen et al. (CCS'18) for many practical parameters, especially in terms of online communication cost. For example, when intersecting 2 28 and 2048 item sets, our protocol reduces the online computation time by more than 71% and communication by more than 63%. When intersecting 2 24 and 4096 item sets, our protocol reduces the online computation time by 27% and communication by 63%. Our comparison to other state-of-theart unbalanced PSI protocols shows that our protocol has the best total communication complexity when |X| ≥ 2 24 . For labeled PSI our protocol also outperforms Chen et al. (CCS'18). When intersecting 2 20 and 256 item sets, with the larger set having associated 288-byte labels, our protocol reduces the online computation time by more than 67% and communication by 34%. Finally, we demonstrate a modification that results in nearly constant communication cost in the larger set size |X|, but impractically high computation complexity on today's CPUs. For example, to intersect a 210-item set with sets of size 2 22 , 2 24 , or 2 26 , our proof-of-concept implementation requires only 0.76 MB of online communication, which is more than a 24-fold improvement over Chen et al. (CCS'18).
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper29
- Laconic Private Set-Intersection From PairingsDiego F. Aranha, Chuanwei Lin, Claudio Orlandi, Mark SimkinCCS 2022 · 被引用 24 次
- PEPSI: Practically Efficient Private Set Intersection in the Unbalanced SettingRasoul Akhavan Mahdavi, Nils Lukas, Faezeh Ebrahimianghazani, Thomas Humphries 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 20 次
- Fuzzy Private Set Intersection with Large HyperballsAron van Baarsen, Sihang PuEUROCRYPT 2024 · 被引用 18 次
- OPTIKS: An Optimized Key Transparency SystemJulia Len, Melissa Chase, Esha Ghosh, Kim Laine 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 18 次
- Batch PIR and Labeled PSI with Oblivious Ciphertext CompressionAlexander Bienstock, Sarvar Patel, Joon Young Seo, Kevin YeoUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 16 次
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic EncryptionHao Chen, Kim Laine, Peter RindalCCS 2017 · 被引用 446 次
- Efficient Batched Oblivious PRF with Applications to Private Set IntersectionVladimir Kolesnikov, Ranjit Kumaresan, Mike Rosulek, Ni TrieuCCS 2016 · 被引用 429 次
- PIR with Compressed Queries and Amortized Query ProcessingSebastian Angel, Hao Chen, Kim Laine, Srinath T. V. SettyS&P 2018 · 被引用 353 次
- Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious SecurityHao Chen, Zhicong Huang, Kim Laine, Peter RindalCCS 2018 · 被引用 242 次
- PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set IntersectionBenny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu, Avishay YanaiEUROCRYPT 2020 · 被引用 198 次
相关 Paper
- Recurrent Private Set Intersection for Unbalanced Databases with Cuckoo Hashing and Leveled FHEEduardo Chielle, Michail ManiatakosNDSS 2025
- Unbalanced Fuzzy Private Set Intersection for L_infinity Distance: Achieving Sublinear Communication with Large Set SizeShengzhe Meng, Xiaodong Wang, Xv Zhou, Bei LiangUSENIX Security 2026
- Efficient Unbalanced Private Set Intersection Cardinality and User-friendly Privacy-preserving Contact TracingMingli Wu, Tsz Hon YuenUSENIX Security 2023
- cwPSU: Efficient Unbalanced Private Set Union via Constant-weight CodesQingwen Li, Song Bian, Hui LiNDSS 2026
- Unbalanced Circuit-PSI from Oblivious Key-Value RetrievalMeng Hao, Weiran Liu, Liqiang Peng, Hongwei Li 等USENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 14 次
