Ideal Pseudorandom Codes
Omar Alrabiah, Prabhanjan Ananth, Miranda Christ, Yevgeniy Dodis, Sam Gunn
摘要
Pseudorandom codes are error-correcting codes with the property that no efficient adversary can distinguish encodings from uniformly random strings. They were recently introduced by Christ and Gunn [CRYPTO 2024] for the purpose of watermarking the outputs of randomized algorithms, such as generative AI models. Several constructions of pseudorandom codes have since been proposed, but none of them are robust to error channels that depend on previously seen codewords. This stronger kind of robustness is referred to as adaptive robustness, and it is important for meaningful applications to watermarking. In this work, we show the following. Adaptive robustness: We show that the pseudorandom codes of Christ and Gunn are adaptively robust, resolving a conjecture posed by Cohen, Hoover, and Schoenbach [S&P 2025]. Our proof involves several new ingredients, combining ideas from both cryptography and coding theory and taking hints from the analysis of Boolean functions. Ideal security: We define an ideal pseudorandom code as one which is indistinguishable from the ideal functionality, capturing both the pseudorandomness and robustness properties in one simple definition. We show that any adaptively robust pseudorandom code for single-bit messages can be bootstrapped to build an ideal pseudorandom code with linear information rate, under no additional assumptions. CCA security: In the setting where the encoding key is made public, we define a CCA-secure pseudorandom code in analogy with CCA-secure encryption. We show that any adaptively robust public-key pseudorandom code for single-bit messages can be used to build a CCA-secure pseudorandom code with linear information rate, in the random oracle model. Together with the result of Christ and Gunn, it follows that there exist ideal pseudorandom codes assuming the 2O(√n)-hardness of LPN. This extends to CCA security in the random oracle model. These results immediately imply stronger robustness guarantees for generative AI watermarking schemes, such as the practical quality-preserving image watermarks of Gunn, Zhao, and Song [ICLR 2025].
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引用它的顶会 Paper4
- Improved Pseudorandom Codes from Permuted PuzzlesMiranda Christ, Noah Golowich, Sam Gunn, Ankur Moitra 等STOC 2026 · 被引用 5 次
- Cryptanalysis of LDPC-Based Pseudorandom Error-Correcting CodesTianrui Wang, Anyu Wang, Tianshuo Cong, Delong Ran 等USENIX Security 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Efficient QC-MDPC Cryptosystems with Bounded Decoding Failure RateAlessandro Annechini, Alessandro Barenghi, Gerardo Pelosi, Simone PerrielloCRYPTO 2026
- Unforgeable Watermarks for Language Models via Robust SignaturesHuijia Lin, Kameron Shahabi, Min Jae SongCRYPTO 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper9
- A Watermark for Large Language ModelsJohn Kirchenbauer, Jonas Geiping, Yuxin Wen, Jonathan Katz 等ICML 2023 · 被引用 854 次
- Provable Robust Watermarking for AI-Generated TextXuandong Zhao, Prabhanjan Vijendra Ananth, Lei Li, Yu-Xiang WangICLR 2024 · 被引用 312 次
- Watermark Stealing in Large Language ModelsNikola Jovanovic, Robin Staab, Martin T. VechevICML 2024 · 被引用 88 次
- Meteor: Cryptographically Secure Steganography for Realistic DistributionsGabriel Kaptchuk, Tushar M. Jois, Matthew Green, Aviel D. RubinCCS 2021 · 被引用 50 次
- Bileve: Securing Text Provenance in Large Language Models Against Spoofing with Bi-level SignatureTong Zhou, Xuandong Zhao, Xiaolin Xu, Shaolei RenNeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 30 次
相关 Paper
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- An Undetectable Watermark for Generative Image ModelsSam Gunn, Xuandong Zhao, Dawn SongICLR 2025
- Watermarking Language Models for Many Adaptive UsersAloni Cohen, Alexander Hoover, Gabe SchoenbachS&P 2025
