Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti
摘要
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility. This can be relaxed by considering an online learning framework in which the sender repeatedly faces a receiver of an unknown, adversarially selected type. We study, for the first time, an online Bayesian persuasion setting with multiple receivers. We focus on the case with no externalities and binary actions, as customary in offline models. Our goal is to design no-regret algorithms for the sender with polynomial per-iteration running time. First, we prove a negative result: for any , there is no polynomial-time no--regret algorithm when the sender's utility function is supermodular or anonymous. Then, we focus on the case of submodular sender's utility functions and we show that, in this case, it is possible to design a polynomial-time no--regret algorithm. To do so, we introduce a general online gradient descent scheme to handle online learning problems with a finite number of possible loss functions. This requires the existence of an approximate projection oracle. We show that, in our setting, there exists one such projection oracle which can be implemented in polynomial time.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper14
- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Decision-MakingJiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar, Goran Radanovic, Adish SinglaAAAI 2022 · 被引用 30 次
- Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian PersuasionMartino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi 等ICML 2023 · 被引用 26 次
- Online Bayesian PersuasionMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola GattiNeurIPS 2020 · 被引用 26 次
- Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the DarkMartino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti 等NeurIPS 2022 · 被引用 19 次
- Strategic Apple TastingKeegan Harris, Chara Podimata, Zhiwei Steven WuNeurIPS 2023 · 被引用 15 次
它引用的顶会 Paper5
- Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of SymmetryMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola GattiAAAI 2021 · 被引用 44 次
- Persuading Voters: It's Easy to Whisper, It's Hard to Speak LoudMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola GattiAAAI 2020 · 被引用 31 次
- Online Bayesian PersuasionMatteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola GattiNeurIPS 2020 · 被引用 26 次
- On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No ExternalitiesHaifeng XuSODA 2020 · 被引用 22 次
- Persuading Voters in District-based ElectionsMatteo Castiglioni, Nicola GattiAAAI 2021 · 被引用 22 次
相关 Paper
- Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a ClueFrancesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi 等NeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 9 次
- Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade From ScratchFrancesco Bacchiocchi, Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi 等NeurIPS 2025 · 被引用 13 次
- Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's TypesMatteo Bollini, Francesco Bacchiocchi, Samuel Coutts, Matteo Castiglioni 等ICML 2026
- Private Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential GamesAndrea Celli, Stefano Coniglio, Nicola GattiAAAI 2020 · 被引用 29 次
- Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best ResponseKunhe Yang, Hanrui ZhangNeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 10 次
