PRowhammer: Propagating Bit-Flips from CPU to GPU
Mrityunjay Shukla, Shubham Roy, Sayandeep Saha, Biswabandan Panda
摘要
The Rowhammer attack is an exploit that induces bit-flips in DRAMs. In the last decade, Rowhammer has been demonstrated on DDRs and LPDDRs used by CPUs, and recently it has been demonstrated on GDDRs used by GPUs. In a heterogeneous system with CPUs and GPUs, GPUs are dependent on the hDRAM (host's DRAM, i.e., CPU's DRAM) as all the data and the code executed on the GPU are first loaded into the hDRAM. We exploit the dependency of GPUs on hDRAM to develop a novel attack called Propagated Rowhammer (PRowhammer), which utilizes CPU-based Rowhammer bit-flips in hDRAM to corrupt GPU code before execution, thereby propagating the bit-flips to the GPU. We exploit two key observations that are, OS page deduplication of GPU shared libraries in hDRAM and inducing bit-flips transform GPU instructions into semantically altered yet valid instructions. Despite challenges such as the massive size of GPU shared libraries (hundreds of megabytes), the closed-source nature of the code, and the use of a proprietary compression algorithm for the SASS (GPU assembly) code, we develop automated techniques to identify exploitable bit-flip locations in hDRAM. We demonstrate PRowhammer on hDRAMs, such as DDRs (DDR3 and DDR4), with NVIDIA's discrete GPUs that utilize the CUDA software stack. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PRowhammer against state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models in realistic black-box settings, where the adversary operates on a CPU and lacks access to the ML model's weights and architecture. With PRowhammer, a single bit-flip in the well-known shared library cuBLASLt degrades image classification accuracy across 16 test cases (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, ResNet-50 and VGG-16 on MNIST, FMNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet) to random guessing, and in the worst-case scenario, it drops to 0%. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of PRowhammer on Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama-2, Mistral, and Falcon, where a single bit-flip in the GGML library reduces the generation quality, resulting in a BERTScore of 25%, which produces gibberish output. Overall, PRowhammer exposes an entirely new class of GPU vulnerabilities stemming from CPU-GPU architectural coupling, demanding holistic security approaches for heterogeneous computing systems.
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