Lune

ACM MM2025顶会

FeatShield: Isolating Malicious Feature Extractors for Backdoor-Robust Federated Learning

Zhou Tan, De Li, Yirui Huang, Jia-Li Yin, Ximeng Liu

2025年份
3被引次数
2顶会引用

摘要

Federated learning remains vulnerable to backdoor attacks through malicious parameter updates, with existing defenses limited by homogeneous data assumptions or reliance on gradient anomaly detection. We reveal that FedAvg's critical flaw lies in malicious feature extractor propagation: aggregating poisoned extractors degrades defense accuracy to <70% across five benchmarks, while benign extractors with poisoned headers retain an average of 89.36% defense accuracy. Therefore, we propose FeatShield, a feature-space isolation framework that prevents backdoor propagation via non-aggregated local extractors trained on clean client data. FeatShield introduces 1) variance-aware alignment, adaptively balancing client-specific features and global consistency using local variance metrics, and 2) adversarial feature synthesis, generating non-linear synthetic features via GAN to enhance the global prediction header's generalization on main tasks. Extensive experiments on eight real-world datasets show that FeatShield achieves the best defense performance. For instance, under heterogeneous data (Dirichlet β=0.5) and strong attacks (50% malicious clients), FeatShield achieves 99.26-99.89% defense accuracy and main task accuracy exceeding FedAvg by 1.32-5.70%, demonstrating its superior resistance to backdoor attacks without sacrificing the benign performance.

问问这篇 Paper

问问你的智能体。

Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。

可以从这些问题问起

智能体调用

Lunesearch_papers

在 Lune 里问

免费开始,无需绑卡

lune papers get 3302e798-e611-4050-b96a-2c50e0ebb74d

引用它的顶会 Paper2

问问它们各自怎么用它

相关 Paper

黄昏的海面,两侧是细线勾勒的悬崖