Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries

Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitarian social choice se ing, where the agents have explicit numerical values for the alternatives, yet they only report their linear orderings over them. To compare di erent aggregation mechanisms, Procaccia and Rosenschein introduced the notion of distortion, which quanti es the ine ciency of using only ordinal information when trying to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of the underlying values of the agents for the chosen outcome. Since then, this research area has ourished and bounds on the distortion have been obtained for a wide variety of fundamental scenarios. However, the vast majority of the existing literature is focused on the case where nothing is known beyond the ordinal preferences of the agents over the alternatives. In this paper, we take a more expressive approach, and consider mechanisms that are allowed to further ask a few cardinal queries in order to gain partial access to the underlying values that the agents have for the alternatives. With this extra power, we design new deterministic mechanisms that achieve signi cantly improved distortion bounds and, in many cases, outperform the best-known randomized ordinal mechanisms. We paint an almost complete picture of the number of queries required by deterministic mechanisms to achieve speci c distortion bounds.