Secure Data Analytics in Apache Spark with Fine-grained Policy Enforcement and Isolated Execution
Byeongwook Kim, Jaewon Hur, Adil Ahmad, Byoungyoung Lee
摘要
—Cloud based Spark platform is a tempting approach for sharing data, as it allows data users to easily analyze the data while the owners to efficiently share the large volume of data. However, the absence of a robust policy enforcement mechanism on Spark hinders the data owners from sharing their data due to the risk of private data breach. In this respect, we found that malicious data users and cloud managers can easily leak the data by constructing a policy violating physical plan, compromising the Spark libraries, or even compromising the Spark cluster itself. Nonetheless, current approaches fail to securely and generally enforce the policies on Spark, as they do not check the policies on physical plan level, and they do not protect the integrity of data analysis pipeline. This paper presents L APUTA 1 , a secure policy enforcement framework on Spark. Specifically, L APUTA designs a pattern matching based policy checking on the physical plans, which is generally applicable to Spark applications with more fine-grained policies. Then, L APUTA compartmentalizes Spark applications based on confidential computing, by which the entire data analysis pipeline is protected from the malicious data users and cloud managers. Meanwhile, L APUTA preserves the usability as the data users can run their Spark applications on L APUTA with minimal modification. We implemented L APUTA , and evaluated its security and performance aspects on TPC-H, Big Data benchmarks, and real world applications using ML models. The evaluation results demonstrated that L APUTA correctly blocks malicious Spark applications while imposing moderate performance overheads.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper7
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,175 次
- RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data LoadStephan van Schaik, Alyssa Milburn, Sebastian Österlund, Pietro Frigo 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 408 次
- ERIM: Secure, Efficient In-process Isolation with Protection Keys (MPK)Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Eslam Elnikety, Nuno O. Duarte, Michael Sammler 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 247 次
- OBLIVIATE: A Data Oblivious Filesystem for Intel SGXAdil Ahmad, Kyungtae Kim, Muhammad Ihsanulhaq Sarfaraz, Byoungyoung LeeNDSS 2018 · 被引用 144 次
- Qapla: Policy compliance for database-backed systemsAastha Mehta, Eslam Elnikety, Katura Harvey, Deepak Garg 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 46 次
相关 Paper
- TaintStream: fine-grained taint tracking for big data platforms through dynamic code translationChengxu Yang, Yuanchun Li, Mengwei Xu, Zhenpeng Chen 等FSE 2021 · 被引用 11 次
- Oblivious coopetitive analytics using hardware enclavesAnkur Dave, Chester Leung, Raluca Ada Popa, Joseph E. Gonzalez 等EuroSys 2020 · 被引用 26 次
- PICACHV: Formally Verified Data Use Policy Enforcement for Secure Data AnalyticsHaobin Hiroki Chen, Hongbo Chen, Mingshen Sun, Chenghong Wang 等USENIX Security 2025
- FLARE: A Fast, Secure, and Memory-Efficient Distributed Analytics Framework (Flavor: Systems)Xiang Li, Fabing Li, Mingyu GaoVLDB 2023 · 被引用 14 次
- Generalized Policy-Based Noninterference for Efficient Confidentiality-PreservationShamiek Mangipudi, Pavel Chuprikov, Patrick Eugster, Malte Viering 等PLDI 2023 · 被引用 3 次
