Efficient Security Support for CXL Memory through Adaptive Incremental Offloaded (Re-)Encryption
Chuanhan Li, Jishen Zhao, Yuanchao Xu
摘要
Current DRAM technologies face critical scaling limitations, significantly impacting the expansion of memory bandwidth and capacity required by modern data-intensive applications. Compute eXpress Link (CXL) emerges as a promising technology to address these limitations, enabling efficient cache-coherent memory expansion through direct connections between processors and CXL memory devices. Despite its potential, broad adoption of CXL memory in public cloud computing introduces substantial security challenges. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX/TDX and AMD SEV, provide robust protection for data integrity and confidentiality in cloud environments, complemented by CXL Integrity and Data Encryption (CXL IDE), which employs XTS encryption and Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for secure message transmission.
However, this approach incurs significant performance overhead due to the latency of XTS encryption on memory-intensive workloads. To mitigate this, we propose Adaptive Incremental Offloaded (Re-)Encryption (AIORE), an adaptive security framework combining Counter (CTR) and XTS encryption. AIORE dynamically selects encryption schemes based on page access frequency, implements incremental and offloaded re-encryption strategies, and leverages memory node computation to reduce overheads. Evaluation with Gem5 across diverse benchmarks reveals that AIORE significantly reduces security overhead by 62.8% on average and maintains overhead within 3.7% relative to an insecure baseline.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper1
问问它们各自怎么用它它引用的顶会 Paper26
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,456 次
- EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGXChristian Priebe, Kapil Vaswani, Manuel CostaS&P 2018 · 被引用 329 次
- Pond: CXL-Based Memory Pooling Systems for Cloud PlatformsHuaicheng Li, Daniel S. Berger, Lisa Hsu, Daniel Ernst 等ASPLOS 2023 · 被引用 328 次
- LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value InjectionJo Van Bulck, Daniel Moghimi, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 275 次
相关 Paper
- SHMemora: Protective Key-Value Store on Distributed Shared MemoryJiajun Luo, Siyu Lin, Yunpeng Xu, Shengwei Liu 等ICDE 2026
- Demystifying CXL Memory with Genuine CXL-Ready Systems and DevicesYan Sun, Yifan Yuan, Zeduo Yu, Reese Kuper 等MICRO 2023 · 被引用 133 次
- MAC: Metadata Acceleration for Sustainable Performance in Big-Data Systems with CXL DRAMDusol Lee, Yan Sun, Houxiang Ji, Vinit Gupta 等OSDI 2026
- Crystalor: Recoverable Memory Encryption Mechanism with Optimized Metadata StructureRei Ueno, Hiromichi Haneda, Naofumi Homma, Akiko Inoue 等CCS 2024
- Battering RAM: Low-Cost Interposer Attacks on Confidential Computing via Dynamic Memory AliasingJesse De Meulemeester, David F. Oswald, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Jo Van BulckS&P 2026 · 被引用 20 次
