LARTS: Language Abstractions for Real-Time and Secure Systems
Yanqi Li, Hongliang Liang, Rui Yao, Yang Zhang, Dong Liu, Lei Wang, Qiuping Yi
摘要
Real-time systems must simultaneously deliver predictable timing, fault isolation, and memory safety, yet current operating systems expose only low-level primitives that force developers to manually balance concurrency, isolation, and performance. This paper presents LARTS, a language-aided runtime system that elevates these requirements into language abstractions with enforceable semantics. LARTS introduces execution domain, a unified process–thread abstraction that combines thread-level responsiveness with process-level isolation. Memory is managed through deterministic memory contracts, which bind allocation at load time to eliminate runtime failures and unpredictable latencies. Domain interactions are expressed via deterministic communication channels that integrate efficient transfer, type safety, and priority inheritance, ensuring analyzable end-to-end bounds. Moreover, LARTS enforces secure-by-construction semantics, making classes of bugs such as double fetch and use-after-free unrepresentable in the programming model. We formalize the core semantics of LARTS and show how they guarantee determinism and safety by design. A prototype built on RTEMS demonstrates that LARTS preserves competitive real-time performance while substantially reducing programming complexity and eliminating vulnerabilities in realistic case studies. Our results suggest that high-assurance real-time programming can be treated not as an ad-hoc engineering problem, but as a first-class abstraction with verifiable semantics.
问问这篇 Paper
问问你的智能体。
Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。
相关 Paper
- TSI: A Time-Semantic Instruction Set for Deterministic Data-Flow Execution in Real-Time Embedded SystemsYinkang Gao, Bo Zhang, Yixuan Zhu, Lei Gong 等RTSS 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- Securing unsafe rust programs with XRustPeiming Liu, Gang Zhao, Jeff HuangICSE 2020 · 被引用 28 次
- The high-level benefits of low-level sandboxingMichael Sammler, Deepak Garg, Derek Dreyer, Tadeusz LitakPOPL 2020 · 被引用 26 次
- TRust: A Compilation Framework for In-process Isolation to Protect Safe Rust against Untrusted CodeInyoung Bang, Martin Kayondo, Hyungon Moon, Yunheung PaekUSENIX Security 2023
- Virtual timeline: a formal abstraction for verifying preemptive schedulers with temporal isolationMengqi Liu, Lionel Rieg, Zhong Shao, Ronghui Gu 等POPL 2020 · 被引用 17 次
