Towards Practical Committee Sizes in YOSO MPC

Secure multi-party computation in permissionless settings like blockchains faces the challenge of maintaining security under adaptive corruptions. YOSO MPC (Benhamouda et al., TCC 2020; Gentry et al., Crypto 2021) addresses this through ephemeral roles, allowing committee members to speak only once before erasing state, thus preventing adaptive attacks within each role's lifetime. However, prior work on YOSO MPC relied on an honest majority within committees and required enormous committee sizes, often numbering in the thousands.

In this paper, we challenge both requirements by leveraging the cryptoeconomic properties of the underlying blockchain. We introduce a mechanism for identifying parties who fail to fulfill their roles during protocol execution, using time-lock puzzles. This enables misbehaving parties to be penalized based on publicly verifiable fraud proofs, allowing for a more aggressive committee threshold. Furthermore, we propose a new sortition procedure that ensures the resulting committee always has a constant size, not just in expectation. This reduces fluctuations in committee size, enabling an even higher committee threshold. These techniques allow us to handle any constant fraction $f < 1$ of total corruptions.

Finally, we refine and generalize the analysis of corruptions in YOSO protocols, obtaining tighter bounds. Combined with our other enhancements, this enables committees of around 100 parties. Our analysis yields a $70$--$80\%$ improvement over the estimates of the seminal work by Benhamouda et al. (TCC 2020). We believe our work paves the way for practical deployments of YOSO MPC protocols.