EL3XIR: Fuzzing COTS Secure Monitors
Christian Lindenmeier, Mathias Payer, Marcel Busch
摘要
ARM TrustZone forms the security backbone of mobile devices. TrustZone-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) facilitate security-sensitive tasks like user authentication, disk encryption, and digital rights management (DRM). As such, bugs in the TEE software stack may compromise the entire system's integrity. EL3XIR introduces a framework to effectively rehost and fuzz the secure monitor firmware layer of proprietary TrustZone-based TEEs. While other approaches have focused on naively rehosting or fuzzing Trusted Applications (EL0) or the TEE OS (EL1), EL3XIR targets the highly-privileged but unexplored secure monitor (EL3) and its unique challenges. Secure monitors expose complex functionality dependent on multiple peripherals through diverse secure monitor calls. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art fuzzing approaches are insufficient to effectively fuzz COTS secure monitors. While naive fuzzing appears to achieve reasonable coverage it fails to overcome coverage walls due to missing peripheral emulation and is limited in the capability to trigger bugs due to the large input space and low quality of inputs. We followed responsible disclosure procedures and reported a total of 34 bugs, out of which 17 were classified as security critical. Affected vendors confirmed 14 of these bugs, and as a result, EL3XIR was assigned six CVEs.
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引用它的顶会 Paper3
- GlobalConfusion: TrustZone Trusted Application 0-Days by DesignMarcel Busch, Philipp Mao, Mathias PayerUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 4 次
- NASS: Fuzzing All Native Android System Services with Interface Awareness and CoveragePhilipp Mao, Marcel Busch, Mathias PayerUSENIX Security 2025
- Dorami: Privilege Separating Security Monitor on RISC-V TEEsMark Kuhne, Stavros Volos, Shweta ShindeUSENIX Security 2025
它引用的顶会 Paper21
- SoK: Understanding the Prevailing Security Vulnerabilities in TrustZone-assisted TEE SystemsDavid Cerdeira, Nuno Santos, Pedro Fonseca, Sandro PintoS&P 2020 · 被引用 231 次
- Razzer: Finding Kernel Race Bugs through FuzzingDae R. Jeong, Kyungtae Kim, Basavesh Shivakumar, Byoungyoung Lee 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 202 次
- DIFUZE: Interface Aware Fuzzing for Kernel DriversJake Corina, Aravind Machiry, Christopher Salls, Yan Shoshitaishvili 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 195 次
- Where Does It Go?: Refining Indirect-Call Targets with Multi-Layer Type AnalysisKangjie Lu, Hong HuCCS 2019 · 被引用 142 次
- BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution EnvironmentsAravind Machiry, Eric Gustafson, Chad Spensky, Christopher Salls 等NDSS 2017 · 被引用 119 次
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