Anamorphic Messaging: Analyzing the Double Ratchet, Triple Ratchet, PQ3, and MLS
Hien Chu, Alessandro Corsi, Paul Rösler
摘要
Anamorphic cryptography targets the scenario in which a dictator does not forbid the use of cryptography but requires all users to reveal their secret keys to them. Thus, the dictator can decrypt all honestly generated ciphertexts. The approach for bypassing this is to identify spots, such as random nonces, in existing cryptographic protocols in which secret messages can be hidden using an additional secret double key. So far, the literature mostly focused on identifying such spots in simple primitives like public-key encryption or signatures; only recently, an initial work identified limited spots in Signal's Double Ratchet Algorithm.
We are the first to leverage the statefulness of cryptographic communication protocols to employ continuously updated double states and, thereby, achieve Forward Security: Even if the adversary (i) observes all traffic, (ii) knows all users' regular secret key material at any stage of the protocol execution, and (iii) at some point learns the secret double state, the entire protocol execution looks benign although covert messages were previously hidden in the traffic anamorphically. We formalize this notion and also cover robustness and authenticity, which appear to be particularly relevant in the messaging context.
In this new model, we study four of the most relevant messaging protocols and identify hiding spots therein: Signal's Double Ratchet, Signal's Triple Ratchet, Apple's PQ3, and the two-party core of the Messaging Layer Security Standard. We focus on the cryptographic parts of these protocols and, despite their complexity, identify surprisingly few anamorphic hiding spots. We prove that all these protocols offer forward secure, authenticated anamorphic channels and we evaluate their bandwidths: While 16 bits can be embedded in every epoch of the Double Ratchet, Triple Ratchet and PQ3 provide 176 bits, respectively 256 bits, of bandwidth per post-quantum epoch, and MLS provides 688 bits per epoch.
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它引用的顶会 Paper37
- A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3Cas Cremers, Marko Horvat, Jonathan Hoyland, Sam Scott 等CCS 2017 · 被引用 247 次
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- Keep the Dirt: Tainted TreeKEM, Adaptively and Actively Secure Continuous Group Key AgreementKaren Klein, Guillermo Pascual-Perez, Michael Walter, Chethan Kamath 等S&P 2021 · 被引用 46 次
- Anamorphic Encryption: Private Communication Against a DictatorGiuseppe Persiano, Duong Hieu Phan, Moti YungEUROCRYPT 2022 · 被引用 45 次
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