Defensive Technology Use by Political Activists During the Sudanese Revolution
Alaa Daffalla, Lucy Simko, Tadayoshi Kohno, Alexandru G. Bardas
摘要
Political activism is a worldwide force in geopolitical change and has, historically, helped lead to greater justice, equality, and stopping human rights abuses. A modern revolution-an extreme form of political activism-pits activists, who rely on technology for critical operational tasks, against a resource-rich government that controls the very telecommunications network they must use to operationalize, putting the technology they use under extreme stress. Our work presents insights about activists' technological defense strategies from interviews with 13 political activists who were active during the 2018-2019 Sudanese revolution. We find that politics and society are driving factors of security and privacy behavior and app adoption. Moreover, a social media blockade can trigger a series of anti-censorship approaches at scale, while a complete internet blackout can cripple activists' use of technology. Even though the activists' technological defenses against the threats of surveillance, arrest and physical device seizure were low tech, they were largely sufficient against their adversary. Through these results, we surface key design principles, but we observe that the generalization of design recommendations often runs into fundamental tensions between the security and usability needs of different user groups. Thus, we provide a set of structured questions in an attempt to turn these tensions into opportunities for technology designers and policy makers.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper25
- SoK: A Framework for Unifying At-Risk User ResearchNoel Warford, Tara Matthews, Kaitlyn Yang, Omer Akgul 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 101 次
- "It's common and a part of being a content creator": Understanding How Creators Experience and Cope with Hate and Harassment OnlineKurt Thomas, Patrick Gage Kelley, Sunny Consolvo, Patrawat Samermit 等CHI 2022 · 被引用 63 次
- SoK: Safer Digital-Safety Research Involving At-Risk UsersRosanna Bellini, Emily Tseng, Noel Warford, Alaa Daffalla 等S&P 2024 · 被引用 48 次
- Collective Information Security in Large-Scale Urban Protests: the Case of Hong KongMartin R. Albrecht, Jorge Blasco, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, Lenka MarekováUSENIX Security 2021 · 被引用 39 次
- "Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures": User Concerns with Mobile Loan Apps in KenyaCollins W. Munyendo, Yasemin Acar, Adam J. AvivS&P 2022 · 被引用 32 次
它引用的顶会 Paper4
- Obstacles to the Adoption of Secure Communication ToolsRuba Abu-Salma, M. Angela Sasse, Joseph Bonneau, Anastasia Danilova 等S&P 2017 · 被引用 170 次
- Computer Security and Privacy for Refugees in the United StatesLucy Simko, Ada Lerner, Samia Ibtasam, Franziska Roesner 等S&P 2018 · 被引用 77 次
- Computer Security and Privacy in the Interactions Between Victim Service Providers and Human Trafficking SurvivorsChristine Chen, Nicola Dell, Franziska RoesnerUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 39 次
- 'I have too much respect for my elders': Understanding South African Mobile Users' Perceptions of Privacy and Current Behaviors on Facebook and WhatsAppJake Reichel, Fleming C. Peck, Mikako Inaba, Bisrat Moges 等USENIX Security 2020
相关 Paper
- Keyboard Fighters: The Use of ICTs by Activists in Times of Military Coup in MyanmarLaura Gianna GuntrumCHI 2024 · 被引用 13 次
- Information Security in Small-Scale Protests: Surveillance of Ugandan Anti-EACOP ProtestersNtezi Mbabazi, Rikke Bjerg JensenUSENIX Security 2026
- Privacy and Activism in the Transgender CommunityAda Lerner, Helen Yuxun He, Anna Kawakami, Silvia Catherine Zeamer 等CHI 2020 · 被引用 66 次
- Anix: Anonymous Blackout-Resistant Microblogging with Message EndorsingSina Kamali, Diogo BarradasS&P 2025
- Under Surveillance: Technology Practices of those Monitored by the StatePedro Sanches, Vasiliki Tsaknaki, Asreen Rostami, Barry BrownCHI 2020 · 被引用 31 次
