QuerySnout: Automating the Discovery of Attribute Inference Attacks against Query-Based Systems
Ana-Maria Cretu, Florimond Houssiau, Antoine Cully, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
摘要
Although query-based systems (QBS) have become one of the main solutions to share data anonymously, building QBSes that robustly protect the privacy of individuals contributing to the dataset is a hard problem. Theoretical solutions relying on differential privacy guarantees are difficult to implement correctly with reasonable accuracy, while ad-hoc solutions might contain unknown vulnerabilities. Evaluating the privacy provided by QBSes must thus be done by evaluating the accuracy of a wide range of privacy attacks. However, existing attacks against QBSes require time and expertise to develop, need to be manually tailored to the specific systems attacked, and are limited in scope. In this paper, we develop QuerySnout, the first method to automatically discover vulnerabilities in query-based systems. QuerySnout takes as input a target record and the QBS as a black box, analyzes its behavior on one or more datasets, and outputs a multiset of queries together with a rule to combine answers to them in order to reveal the sensitive attribute of the target record. QuerySnout uses evolutionary search techniques based on a novel mutation operator to find a multiset of queries susceptible to lead to an attack, and a machine learning classifier to infer the sensitive attribute from answers to the queries selected. We showcase the versatility of QuerySnout by applying it to two attack scenarios (assuming access to either the private dataset or to a different dataset from the same distribution), three real-world datasets, and a variety of protection mechanisms. We show the attacks found by QuerySnout to consistently equate or outperform, sometimes by a large margin, the best attacks from the literature. We finally show how QuerySnout can be extended to QBSes that require a budget, and apply QuerySnout to a simple QBS based on the Laplace mechanism. Taken together, our results show how powerful and accurate attacks against QBSes can already be found by an automated system, allowing for highly complex QBSes to be automatically tested "at the pressing of a button". We believe this line of research to be crucial to improve the robustness of systems providing privacy-preserving access to personal data in theory and in practice.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper2
- A Linear Reconstruction Approach for Attribute Inference Attacks against Synthetic DataMeenatchi Sundaram Muthu Selva Annamalai, Andrea Gadotti, Luc RocherUSENIX Security 2024 · 被引用 37 次
- "Get in Researchers; We're Measuring Reproducibility": A Reproducibility Study of Machine Learning Papers in Tier 1 Security ConferencesDaniel Olszewski, Allison Lu, Carson Stillman, Kevin Warren 等CCS 2023 · 被引用 19 次
相关 Paper
- QueryCheetah: Fast Automated Discovery of Attribute Inference Attacks Against Query-Based SystemsBozhidar Stevanoski, Ana-Maria Cretu, Yves-Alexandre de MontjoyeCCS 2024
- DP-Sniper: Black-Box Discovery of Differential Privacy Violations using ClassifiersBenjamin Bichsel, Samuel Steffen, Ilija Bogunovic, Martin T. VechevS&P 2021 · 被引用 53 次
- When the Signal is in the Noise: Exploiting Diffix's Sticky NoiseAndrea Gadotti, Florimond Houssiau, Luc Rocher, Benjamin Livshits 等USENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 21 次
- Local Dampening: Differential Privacy for Non-numeric Queries via Local SensitivityVictor A. E. de Farias, Felipe T. Brito, Cheryl J. Flynn, Javam C. Machado 等VLDB 2021 · 被引用 20 次
- Information Leakage From Prices in Query-Based Data MarketsTeng Tu, Huanhuan Peng, Xiaoye Miao, Guanjie Cheng 等ICDE 2026
