Off-Path Network Traffic Manipulation via Revitalized ICMP Redirect Attacks

ICMP redirect is a mechanism that allows an end host to dynamically update its routing decisions for particular destinations. Previous studies show that ICMP redirect may be exploited by attackers to manipulate the routing of victim traffic. However, it is widely believed that ICMP redirect attacks are not a real-world threat since they can only occur under specific network topologies (e.g., LAN). In this paper, we conduct a systematic study on the legitimacy check mechanism of ICMP and uncover a fundamental gap between the check mechanism and stateless protocols, resulting in a wide range of vulnerabilities. In particular, we find that off-path attackers can utilize a suite of stateless protocols (e.g., UDP, ICMP, GRE, IPIP and SIT) to easily craft evasive ICMP error messages, thus revitalizing ICMP redirect attacks to cause serious damage in the real world, particularly, on the wide-area network. First, we show that off-path attackers can conduct a stealthy DoS attack by tricking various public servers on the Internet into mis-redirecting their traffic into black holes with a single forged ICMP redirect message. For example, we reveal that more than 43K popular websites on the Internet are vulnerable to this DoS attack. In addition, we identify 54.47K open DNS resolvers and 186 Tor nodes on the Internet are vulnerable as well. Second, we show that, by leveraging ICMP redirect attacks against NATed networks, off-path attackers in the same NATed network can perform a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to intercept the victim traffic. Finally, we develop countermeasures to throttle these attacks.