Exposing Congestion Attack on Emerging Connected Vehicle based Traffic Signal Control
Qi Alfred Chen, Yucheng Yin, Yiheng Feng, Z. Morley Mao, Henry X. Liu
摘要
Connected vehicle (CV) technology will soon transform today's transportation systems by connecting vehicles and the transportation infrastructure through wireless communication. Having demonstrated the potential to greatly improve transportation mobility efficiency, such dramatically increased connectivity also opens a new door for cyber attacks. In this work, we perform the first detailed security analysis of the nextgeneration CV-based transportation systems. As a first step, we target the USDOT (U.S. Department of Transportation) sponsored CV-based traffic control system, which has been tested and shown high effectiveness in real road intersections. In the analysis, we target a realistic threat, namely CV data spoofing from one single attack vehicle, with the attack goal of creating traffic congestion. We first analyze the system design and identify data spoofing strategies that can potentially influence the traffic control. Based on the strategies, we perform vulnerability analysis by exhaustively trying all the data spoofing options for these strategies to understand the upper bound of the attack effectiveness. For the highly effective cases, we analyze the causes and find that the current signal control algorithm design and implementation choices are highly vulnerable to data spoofing attacks from even a single attack vehicle. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to completely reverse the benefit of the CV-based signal control system by causing the traffic mobility to be 23.4% worse than that without adopting such system. We then construct practical exploits and evaluate them under real-world intersection settings. The evaluation results are consistent with our vulnerability analysis, and we find that the attacks can even cause a blocking effect to jam an entire approach. In the jamming period, 22% of the vehicles need to spend over 7 minutes for an original halfminute trip, which is 14 times higher. We also discuss defense directions leveraging the insights from our analysis.
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