IA-CCF: Individual Accountability for Permissioned Ledgers
Alex Shamis, Peter R. Pietzuch, Burcu Canakci, Miguel Castro, Cédric Fournet, Edward Ashton, Amaury Chamayou, Sylvan Clebsch, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Matthew Kerner, Julien Maffre, Olga Vrousgou
摘要
Permissioned ledger systems allow a consortium of members that do not trust one another to execute transactions safely on a set of replicas. Such systems typically use Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols to distribute trust, which only ensures safety when fewer than 1/3 of the replicas misbehave. Providing guarantees beyond this threshold is a challenge: current systems assume that the ledger is corrupt and fail to identify misbehaving replicas or hold the members that operate them accountable -- instead all members share the blame. We describe IA-CCF, a new permissioned ledger system that provides individual accountability. It can assign blame to the individual members that operate misbehaving replicas regardless of the number of misbehaving replicas or members. IA-CCF achieves this by signing and logging BFT protocol messages in the ledger, and by using Merkle trees to provide clients with succinct, universally-verifiable receipts as evidence of successful transaction execution. Anyone can audit the ledger against a set of receipts to discover inconsistencies and identify replicas that signed contradictory statements. IA-CCF also supports changes to consortium membership and replicas by tracking signing keys using a sub-ledger of governance transactions. IA-CCF provides strong disincentives to misbehavior with low overhead: it executes 47,000 tx/s while providing clients with receipts in two network round trips.
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引用它的顶会 Paper10
- Dissecting BFT Consensus: In Trusted Components we Trust!Suyash Gupta, Sajjad Rahnama, Shubham Pandey, Natacha Crooks 等EuroSys 2023 · 被引用 27 次
- Confidential Consortium Framework: Secure Multiparty Applications with Confidentiality, Integrity, and High AvailabilityHeidi Howard, Fritz Alder, Edward Ashton, Amaury Chamayou 等VLDB 2024 · 被引用 22 次
- PrestigeBFT: Revolutionizing View Changes in BFT Consensus Algorithms with Reputation MechanismsGengrui Zhang, Fei Pan, Sofia Tijanic, Hans-Arno JacobsenICDE 2024 · 被引用 21 次
- OptiLog: Assigning Roles in Byzantine ConsensusHanish Gogada, Christian Berger, Leander Jehl, Hans P. Reiser 等EuroSys 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Cabinet: Dynamically Weighted Consensus Made FastGengrui Zhang, Shiquan Zhang, Michail Bachras, Yuqiu Zhang 等VLDB 2025 · 被引用 1 次
它引用的顶会 Paper6
- The Honey Badger of BFT ProtocolsAndrew Miller, Yu Xia, Kyle Croman, Elaine Shi 等CCS 2016 · 被引用 974 次
- Enhancing Bitcoin Security and Performance with Strong Consistency via Collective SigningEleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Nicolas Gailly, Ismail Khoffi 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 769 次
- Byzantine Ordered Consensus without Byzantine OligarchyYunhao Zhang, Srinath T. V. Setty, Qi Chen, Lidong Zhou 等OSDI 2020 · 被引用 131 次
- EverCrypt: A Fast, Verified, Cross-Platform Cryptographic ProviderJonathan Protzenko, Bryan Parno, Aymeric Fromherz, Chris Hawblitzel 等S&P 2020 · 被引用 114 次
- No Right to Remain Silent: Isolating Malicious MixesHemi Leibowitz, Ania M. Piotrowska, George Danezis, Amir HerzbergUSENIX Security 2019 · 被引用 23 次
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