ReCon: Efficient Detection, Management, and Use of Non-Speculative Information Leakage
Pavlos Aimoniotis, Amund Bergland Kvalsvik, Xiaoyue Chen, Magnus Själander, Stefanos Kaxiras
摘要
In a speculative side-channel attack, a secret is improperly accessed and then leaked by passing it to a transmitter instruction. Several proposed defenses effectively close this security hole by either delaying the secret from being loaded or propagated, or by delaying dependent transmitters (e.g., loads) from executing when fed with tainted input derived from an earlier speculative load. This results in a loss of memory-level parallelism and performance.
A security definition proposed recently, in which data already leaked in non-speculative execution need not be considered secret during speculative execution, can provide a solution to the loss of performance. However, detecting and tracking non-speculative leakage carries its own cost, increasing complexity. The key insight of our work that enables us to exploit non-speculative leakage as an optimization to other secure speculation schemes is that the majority of non-speculative leakage is simply due to pointer dereferencing (or base-address indexing) -essentially what many secure speculation schemes prevent from taking place speculatively.
We present ReCon that: i) efficiently detects non-speculative leakage by limiting detection to pairs of directly-dependent loads that dereference pointers (or index a base-address); and ii) piggybacks non-speculative leakage information on the coherence protocol. In ReCon, the coherence protocol remembers and propagates the knowledge of what has leaked and therefore what is safe to dereference under speculation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of ReCon, we show how two state-of-the-art secure speculation schemes, Non-speculative Data Access (NDA) and speculative Taint Tracking (STT), leverage this information to enable more memorylevel parallelism both in a single core scenario and in a multicore scenario: NDA with ReCon reduces the performance loss by 28.7% for SPEC2017, 31.5% for SPEC2006, and 46.7% for PARSEC; STT with ReCon reduces the loss by 45.1%, 39%, and 78.6%, respectively.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper2
- Perspective: A Principled Framework for Pliable and Secure Speculation in Operating SystemsTae Hoon Kim, David Rudo, Kaiyang Zhao, Zirui Neil Zhao 等ISCA 2024 · 被引用 6 次
- ShadowBinding: Realizing Effective Microarchitectures for In-Core Secure Speculation SchemesAmund Bergland Kvalsvik, Magnus SjälanderMICRO 2025 · 被引用 1 次
它引用的顶会 Paper20
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User SpaceMoritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,456 次
- ret2spec: Speculative Execution Using Return Stack BuffersGiorgi Maisuradze, Christian RossowCCS 2018 · 被引用 282 次
- SMoTherSpectre: Exploiting Speculative Execution through Port ContentionAtri Bhattacharyya, Alexandra Sandulescu, Matthias Neugschwandtner, Alessandro Sorniotti 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 267 次
- Data Oblivious ISA Extensions for Side Channel-Resistant and High Performance ComputingJiyong Yu, Lucas Hsiung, Mohamad El Hajj, Christopher W. FletcherNDSS 2019 · 被引用 106 次
相关 Paper
- Doppelganger Loads: A Safe, Complexity-Effective Optimization for Secure Speculation SchemesAmund Bergland Kvalsvik, Pavlos Aimoniotis, Stefanos Kaxiras, Magnus SjälanderISCA 2023 · 被引用 9 次
- Speculative Privacy Tracking (SPT): Leaking Information From Speculative Execution Without Compromising PrivacyRutvik Choudhary, Jiyong Yu, Christopher W. Fletcher, Adam MorrisonMICRO 2021 · 被引用 33 次
- Speculative Data-Oblivious Execution: Mobilizing Safe Prediction For Safe and Efficient Speculative ExecutionJiyong Yu, Namrata Mantri, Josep Torrellas, Adam Morrison 等ISCA 2020 · 被引用 50 次
- unXpec: Breaking Undo-based Safe SpeculationMengming Li, Chenlu Miao, Yilong Yang, Kai BuHPCA 2022 · 被引用 9 次
- Peek-a-Walk: Leaking Secrets via Page Walk Side ChannelsAlan Wang, Boru Chen, Yingchen Wang, Christopher W. Fletcher 等S&P 2025
