Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Tasks
Yuqing Kong
摘要
In the setting where participants are asked multiple similar possibly subjective multi-choice questions (e.g. Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), a series of peer prediction mechanisms are designed to incentivize honest reports and some of them achieve dominantly truthfulness: truth-telling is a dominant strategy and strictly dominate other "non-permutation strategy" with some mild conditions. However, a major issue hinders the practical usage of those mechanisms: they require the participants to perform an infinite number of tasks. When the participants perform a finite number of tasks, these mechanisms only achieve approximated dominant truthfulness. The existence of a dominantly truthful multi-task peer prediction mechanism that only requires a finite number of tasks remains to be an open question that may have a negative result, even with full prior knowledge.
This paper answers this open question by proposing a new mechanism, Determinant based Mutual Information Mechanism (DMI-Mechanism), that is dominantly truthful when the number of tasks is ≥ 2C. C is the number of choices for each question (C = 2 for binary-choice questions). DMI-Mechanism also pays truth-telling higher than any strategy profile and strictly higher than uninformative strategy profiles (informed truthfulness). In addition to the truthfulness properties, DMI-Mechanism is also easy to implement since it does not require any prior knowledge (detailfree) and only requires ≥ 2 participants. The core of DMI-Mechanism is a novel information measure, Determinant based Mutual Information (DMI). DMI generalizes Shannon's mutual information and the square of DMI has a simple unbiased estimator. In addition to incentivizing honest reports, DMI-Mechanism can also be transferred into an information evaluation rule that identifies high-quality information without verification when there are ≥ 3 participants.
To the best of our knowledge, DMI-Mechanism is both the first detail-free informed-truthful mechanism and the first dominantly truthful mechanism that works for a finite number of tasks, not to say a small constant number of tasks.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper12
- Truthful Data Acquisition via Peer PredictionYiling Chen, Yiheng Shen, Shuran ZhengNeurIPS 2020 · 被引用 35 次
- Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and PreferencesGrant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai TaoNeurIPS 2021 · 被引用 22 次
- Incentivizing Truthful Language Models via Peer Elicitation GamesBaiting Chen, Tong Zhu, Jiale Han, Lexin Li 等NeurIPS 2025 · 被引用 9 次
- Eliciting Thinking Hierarchy without a PriorYuqing Kong, Yunqi Li, Yubo Zhang, Zhihuan Huang 等NeurIPS 2022 · 被引用 9 次
- Peer Prediction for Learning AgentsShi Feng, Fang-Yi Yu, Yiling ChenNeurIPS 2022 · 被引用 9 次
相关 Paper
- Multitask Peer Prediction With Task-dependent StrategiesYichi Zhang, Grant SchoenebeckWWW 2023 · 被引用 7 次
- Stochastically Dominant Peer PredictionYichi Zhang, Shengwei Xu, Grant Schoenebeck, David M. PennockNeurIPS 2025 · 被引用 2 次
- Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical EstimationYuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Yi YuAAAI 2020 · 被引用 22 次
- Information Elicitation from Rowdy CrowdsGrant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu, Yichi ZhangWWW 2021 · 被引用 18 次
- Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and BeyondYiling Chen, Shi Feng, Fang-Yi YuNeurIPS 2024 · 被引用 5 次
