Pave: Information Flow Control for Privacy-preserving Online Data Processing Services
Minkyung Park, Jaeseung Choi, Hyeonmin Lee, Ted Taekyoung Kwon
摘要
In online data-processing services, a user typically hands over personal data to a remote server beyond the user's control. In such environments, the user cannot be assured that the data is protected from potential leaks. We introduce Pave, a new framework to guarantee data privacy while being processed remotely. Pave provides an arbitrary data-processing program with a sandboxed execution environment. The runtime monitor, PaveBox, intercepts all data flows into and out of the sandbox, allowing them only if they do not compromise user data. At the same time, it guarantees that the benign flows will not be hampered to preserve the program's functionality. As the PaveBox is built on top of Intel SGX, a user can verify the integrity and confidentiality of the PaveBox by remote attestation. We provide a formal model of Pave and prove its security and carry out the quantitative analysis with prototype-based experiments.
问问这篇 Paper
智能体会读完全文。
Lune 把这篇 Paper 索引到了每一个公式,引用它的顶会 Paper 也一样。你提问,回答直接引用原文。
引用它的顶会 Paper2
- IOValve: Leakage-Free I/O Sandbox for Large-Scale Untrusted Data ProcessingSangho Lee, Jules Drean, Yue Tan, Marcus PeinadoCCS 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Container Systems: An Empirical StudyWeijie Liu, Hongbo Chen, Shuo Huai, Zhen Xu 等FSE 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper39
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin 等S&P 2019 · 被引用 2,435 次
- Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order ExecutionJo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin 等USENIX Security 2018 · 被引用 1,175 次
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch ShadowingSangho Lee, Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim 等USENIX Security 2017 · 被引用 536 次
- DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPeter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz 等USENIX Security 2016 · 被引用 500 次
- ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data SamplingMichael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Moghimi, Jo Van Bulck 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 464 次
相关 Paper
- OPERA: Open Remote Attestation for Intel's Secure EnclavesGuoxing Chen, Yinqian Zhang, Ten-Hwang LaiCCS 2019 · 被引用 67 次
- SGXLock: Towards Efficiently Establishing Mutual Distrust Between Host Application and Enclave for SGXYuan Chen, Jiaqi Li, Guorui Xu, Yajin Zhou 等USENIX Security 2022
- MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third PartiesGuoxing Chen, Yinqian ZhangUSENIX Security 2022
- COIN Attacks: On Insecurity of Enclave Untrusted Interfaces in SGXMustakimur Rahman Khandaker, Yueqiang Cheng, Zhi Wang, Tao WeiASPLOS 2020 · 被引用 46 次
- LightBox: Full-stack Protected Stateful Middlebox at Lightning SpeedHuayi Duan, Cong Wang, Xingliang Yuan, Yajin Zhou 等CCS 2019 · 被引用 88 次
