GhostTac: Manipulating Tactile Sensors without Physical Contact

Tactile sensors are integral components of modern robotic systems, enabling robots to perceive and interact with the physical environment through tactile feedback. Despite their importance, the physical-layer security of tactile sensors has received little attention in prior work. In this paper, we present GhostTac, to the best of our knowledge, the first contactless attack that manipulates tactile sensing via electromagnetic interference (EMI). We identify that EMI exploits the nonlinear rectification and limited bandwidth amplification effects, allowing carefully crafted EMI signals to be converted into a persistent DC offset that bypasses on-board filtering and induces stable measurement deviations. Building on this mechanism, GhostTac enables fine-grained and controllable manipulation of sensor outputs by reshaping the spatial distribution and manipulating the magnitude at the targeted location. Such interference can induce unintended and harmful robot behaviors, such as causing a domestic robot to exert excessive force, resulting in physical damage or human injury. We evaluate GhostTac on 10 sensor modules and 2 dexterous hands, covering 15 tactile sensors of different types, and demonstrate consistent attack effectiveness across all tested devices. We further present three case studies on tactile grasping, slip detection, and material classification to illustrate practical impacts in real robotic tasks. We envision that our findings shed light on a new physical attack vector against tactile sensing in robotic systems.