Temporal Robustness against Data poisoning

Data poisoning considers cases when an adversary manipulates the behavior of machine learning algorithms through malicious training data. Existing threat models of data poisoning center around a single metric, the number of poisoned samples. In consequence, if attackers can poison more samples than expected with affordable overhead, as in many practical scenarios, they may be able to render existing defenses ineffective in a short time. To address this issue, we leverage timestamps denoting the birth dates of data, which are often available but neglected in the past. Benefiting from these timestamps, we propose a temporal threat model of data poisoning with two novel metrics, earliness and duration, which respectively measure how long an attack started in advance and how long an attack lasted. Using these metrics, we define the notions of temporal robustness against data poisoning, providing a meaningful sense of protection even with unbounded amounts of poisoned samples when the attacks are temporally bounded. We present a benchmark with an evaluation protocol simulating continuous data collection and periodic deployments of updated models, thus enabling empirical evaluation of temporal robustness. Lastly, we develop and also empirically verify a baseline defense, namely temporal aggregation, offering provable temporal robustness and highlighting the potential of our temporal threat model for data poisoning.