Could you clean up the Internet with a Pit of Tar? Investigating tarpit feasibility on Internet worms
Harm Griffioen, Christian Doerr
Abstract
Botnets often spread through massive Internet-wide scanning, identifying and infecting vulnerable Internet-facing devices to grow their network. Taking down these networks is often hard for law enforcement, and some people have proposed tarpits as a defensive method because it does not require seizing infrastructure or rely on device owners to make sure their devices are well-configured and protected. These tarpits are network services that aim to keep a malware-infected device busy and slow down or eradicate the malicious behavior.This paper identifies a network-based tarpit vulnerability in stateless-scanning malware and develops a tarpitting exploit. We apply this technique against malware based on the Mirai scanning routine to identify whether tarpitting at scale is effective in containing the spread of self-propagating malware. We demonstrate that we can effectively trap thousands of devices even in a single tarpit and that this significantly slows down botnet spreading across the Internet and provide a framework to simulate malware spreading under various network conditions to apriori evaluate the effect of tarpits on a particular malware. We show that the self-propagating malware could be contained with the help of a few thousand tarpits without any measurable adverse impact on compromised routers or Internet Service Providers, and we release our tarpitting solution as an open platform to the community to realize this.
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